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ABSTRACT
Development planning policy motivated by experience, has come to
stress the advantages of flexibility, beneficiary participation and the
decentralization of decision-making in the implemlentation of complex
urban programs. These trends place ever greater reliance on local power
structures which are noted for their consistent resistence to social
progress. The composition, operative interests and interrelationships
of dominant local groups indicates both significant constraints and
opportunities for their engagement. Experience demonstrates that they
have had positive, as well as negative, impact on programs which pro-
mote social change. Analysis of their past behavior indicates means by
which various dominant factions and individuals may be mobilized by
advocates of reform and opposition neutralized in persuing the
successive requirements of program implementation. The thesis concludes
that, while dramatic societal change is not to be expected, greater
progress toward social and economic equity is feasible within existing
power structures.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Ralph Gakenheimer
Title: Professor of Urban Planning and Civil Engineering
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INTRODUCTION
Latin America has remained frustratingly unresponsive to the attempts
of reform-minded agents to bring about significant social change.
Developmental efforts, promoted from both within and without the con-
tinent, have produced such disappointing results as to give growing
credence to the proposition that only violent revolution can achieve
real progress there.
Yet, of all the less developed regions of the world, Latin America
would appear to possess conditions most propitious to rational, peaceful
and sustained development. Culturally, it is dominated by educated,
Christian elites whose European roots give them much in common with the
most progressive western democracies. Its political institutions are
based on ideals similar to those of much of the developed world, it
commands the natural and human resources which make prosperity possible,
and it has had, nominally at least, political independence under sovereign,
democratic regimes for over a century. Why then has it remained so
tenaciously resistent to economic development and social progress?
A central dilemma is the apparent conflict between the narrow
special interests of entrenched oligarchies and programs which envision
greater economic and political equity. Latin elites are claimed to be
exceptionally reluctant to accept social reform and consistently
effective in impeding it. Intuitively, it is difficult to accept that
an entire continent is dominated by aspirations so diverse from those
espoused by nations founded on similar values, or that minute interest
groups should be able to maintain a stranglehold over large, free,
heterogeneous societies. Furthermore, if experience in Latin America has
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proved generally discouraging, there has been a sufficient number of
successful developmental endeavors to warrant investigation of the factors
which made them possible. Why would the all-powerful elites permit,
even support, progress in some instances? Or has it been accomplished
against their will?
One is also prompted to question the effect of global planning
trends on these groups. Progress in developmental planning has been
likened to the peeling away of layer upon layer of misunderstanding.
Two layers which seem to be almost discarded are the one which per-
ceives development strictly in terms of national economic growth and
that which envisions the process to be imposed by a small, select group
of planning experts. The understanding which experience has brought
has generated both greater humility and broader ambitions. While we
are becoming aware of the complexity of issues - that they defy simplistic,
imperious approaches - we are also becoming determined to address them
at more fundamental levels: the building of cohesive communities rather
than of hydroelectric plants or structural changes in land tenure
rather than model housing projects. This sort of enterprise is not
achieved by merely throwing money at it, or expertise; it requires the
conviction, competence and active involvement of those actors responsible
for getting the job done.
This thesis proposes that existing Latin social structures provide
opportunities for their engagement in programs of positive change.
It analyses the composition of urban power structures in an attempt to
identify their operative interests and spheres of influence, observes
the application of their power in developmental programs and articulates
means by which this power can be mobilized within developmental
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endeavors. it does not propose new means of achieving momentous
structural change in Latin society, but rather, methods of discovering
"chinks in the armor," opportunities for building the support, and for
neutralizing the opposition, of those in power. Its basic question is:
How can these groups be induced to further current developmental goals?
Urban development is of particular concern in that Latin America is
rapidly becoming one of the most urbanized regions in the world By the
end of the century three out of four Latin Americans will inhabit some of
the world's largest cities. As the inequities of wealth and opportunity
become more concentrated, and more visible, in urban settings, their
brutality becomes more intolerable and the propensity to violent
solutions more inevitable. Reliable, far-reaching ur-oan development
policies have become essential to maintaining political order as well
as to reducing social injustive and to promoting economic growth.
Specific programs, while they may not be the sole, or even the most
reliable, means of promoting change, serve as important catalysts to those
who seek development. They are also useful in providing a comprehensible
context in which to evaluate performance, in the light of articulated
objectives, during the implementation phase, when the complex political
interrElationships of the various local interests come into their own.
The substance of this thesis is largely derived from the author's
experience in coordinating, over a five year period, an urban development
program in Sio Luis, Brazil and his subsequent one year fellowship in
M.I.T.'s Special Program for Urban and Regional Studies in Developing
Areas (SPURS). It was written under the supervision of Ralph Gakenheimer,
Professor of Urban Planning and Civil Engineering and Peter Smith,
Professor of History and Political Science.
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CHAPTER I
THE CONTEXT: DEVELOPMENT PLANNING TRENDS
The destinies of most third world societies, and certainly of Latin
American ones, have long been dependent on national and international
events far beyond their own control. Not only are they subject to the
decisions of distant political leaders and financiers, but their cultural
aspirations and intellectual convictions have also come to rely heavily
on foreign influence. No where is this dependency more apparent than in
developmental planning, where a small group of first world thinkers
largely determines what development is and how it is to be achieved.
Communication technology, ease of travel and the proliferation of inter-
national scholarships in concert with the traditional expectation of
guidance from the North assure the immediate dissemination of each new
paradigm, and more often than not, it's enthusiastic adoption. While
these changes in approach may not alter ingrained attitudes to any great
degree, they do effect the formal behavior of even local decision-makers,
by changing their interaction with powers beyond their spheres of
influence as well as expanding or contracting those spheres. There
exists a fairly continuous linkage from first world academia to the barrio.
A generation's effort, by some of the planet's most astute minds
and rationally conceived organizations, to bring about a more equitable
distribution of the worlds wealth, has proved the task to be elusive.
The initial confidence in our ability to induce sustained economic
growth, acquired largely through the effective regeneration of post war
Europe and Japan, has been considerably undermined by subsequent
experience-in many of the less developed nations. While definitions of
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"success" and "failure" leave considerable room for debate, the field
of developmental planning has become dominated by dissatisfaction and
the recognition that solutions are not as obvious as they once seemed.
Albert Hirschman, one of the most respected scholars of development
economics, summarises the situation thus:
"Our subdiscipline has achieved its considerable
lustre and excitement through the implicit idea
that it could slay the dragon of bacKwardness
virtually by itself, or at least, that its
contribution to the task was central. We know
now that this is not so."I
There is a growing awareness that the issues involve more social,
political and cultural variables than were formerly appreciated; that
the simple beefing-up of insufficient domestic savings with foreign
investment is not a universal recipe for prosperity, nor that any other
economic paradigm, by itself, guarantees progress. Perhaps most signi-
ficant is the growing conviction that industrial expansion is not the
same thing as development. While no one denies that wealth must be
produced before it can be distributed, writers such as Paul Streeten,
John Grant, and M.D. Morris2 argue convincingly that G.N.P. bears little
relation to the welfare of the bulk of the population in many developing
countries. The extremely skewed allocation patterns have focused much
attention on achieving more equitable personal and regional income dis-
tribution. Some writers go farther to claim that it is not so much
income as "entitlement" that needs to be distributed. Amartya sen, for
instance, states that the commodity bundle a person can command provides
the most helpful format for characterizing economic development and that
this depends on the political arrangements which determine his ownership
and his exchange possibilities.3
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Even economists, not to mention sociologists and political
scientists, extend the meaning of development beyond physiological well
being. Michael Todaro stresses that in addition to life sustenance,
development must seek to achieve individual freedom from servitude and
the promotion of self esteem. Approaching the pole opposite that of the
dogmatic neo-classic economists one encounters Gandhi's extortation
to promote the "realization of human potential" and Octavio Paz's asser-
tion that "development and underdevelopment are exclusively socioeconomic
concepts with which we pretend to measure societies as if they were
quantitative realities. That way, all those aspects that defy statistics
and give shape to society are not accounted for: its culture, its
history, its sensibility, its art, its goals, its cuisine, everything that
used to be called the soul or spirit of the people, its own way of
being."4
If there is still considerable debate on how to achieve development,
and even on what it is, there are fairly universal policy trends among
the multilateral agencies which dominate the field - the international,
regional and national development banKs. Following two decades of
concentration on capital investments designed to create the conditions
for Walt Rostow's "take-off", two influential analyses, the Pearson Re-
port and the Jackson Report raised serious doubts as to the efficacy of
this approach alone.5 They were joined by voices and institutions
(notably ECLA, in Latin America) which questioned everything from the
international economic order to investment priorities and social justice.
One significant result was a shift in World Bank policy under Robert
McNamara's leadership in the early 1970's, to address urban problems,
and specifically the urban poor. The "basic needs" approach came into
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being. Low-income housing, slum upgrading, sites and services, urban
employment and micro infrastructure joined rural development and macro
infrastructure projects in the Bank's, and other donor agency's, lend-
ing programs. Acknowledging the complex societal relationships and
structural nature of these undertakings "integrated" and "multisectoral"
programs were designed to simultaneously address a broad range of issues.
At about the same time "water's edge" financing started becoming
prevalent. Both developmental and commercial banks had come under
criticism for interference in the internal affairs of their client
nations. From now on the national governments would guarantee loan
repayment, but accept no conditions or influence from the lender on its
application. Countries, not projects, were to be financed. Since entire
countries were not expected to go bankrupt, and the banks were happy to
be relieved of the responsibility, and risk, of specific projects this
arrangement was agreeable to all. (In any case, the banks have the
U.S. taxpayer as ultimate insurance).
These two factors - the complexity of projects in which human
resources overshadow financial ones and lack of perceived risk on the
part of the lender - have created a situation where success depends
almost entirely on the commitment and competence of the borrower.
Evaluation of a decade of this policy has again raised doubts. Except
for a few exceptions, notably in Eastern Asia, results have generally
fallen short of expectations. Urban equity and entitlement have not made
great strides in most of the developing world.
There are of course extenuating circumstances. Integrated projects
directed towards the poor are admittedly ambitious; they attempt to
change deep-rooted and persistent problems. Furthermore, global economic
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upheaval during the 1970's has hit many developing countries particularly
hard; climate has been exceptionally uncooperative in some major
regions; urban migration has proceeded at unprevendented rates; and, to
a degree, even the successes of developmental efforts (reduced infant
mortality and increased life expectancy) have exacerbated problems of
urban misery.
EMERGING PRAGMATISM
At the current stage of developmental planning much attention is
being given to the political nature of the process and to the trans-
actional requirements of program implementation. This pragmatism
transcends the evaluation of narrow program objectives in an attempt to
discern its contribution to more general policy goals. Donor agencies
have come to place great emphasis on replicability - the ability of an
endeavor to perpetuate itself and to alter an environment such that it
is more receptive to future efforts.
The World Bank, in evaluating its first decade of urban development
experience nas attempted to identify the most pervasive obstacles to
this approach.6 High on the list is a concern with institutional frame-
work - the weakness, or unresponsiveness, of existing institutions.
It cites the strengthening of urban institutions as one of the most
difficult tasKs of its operations. Cost recovery has also become a
fundamental component in achieving replicability in poor nations.
Instilling a credit mentality among people who live from hand to mouth,
who have had little exposure to the protestant ethic and who are fre-
quently subject to the immediate creditor's failure to live up to his
part of the bargain is a daunting tasK, and a politically unappealing
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one. Other factors such as overly ambitious construction standards,
highly inequitable conditions of land tenure and inadequate management
skills are also stressed. Beneficiary participation is recognized as
a critical element of replicability and, in this regard, the importance
of the so-called "special components" of health, training and community
development, the implementation of which has been particularly
frustrating. In the Bank's words: "Neighborhood politics have been
beyond the effective reach of the Bank and its intermediaries." Assuming
"intermediaries" to mean national bureaucracies, it is probable that
municipal and state politics are also largely beyond their reach, and
perhaps that of the "intermediaries" as well.
Recognition of the limitations of foreign donor agencies and federal
governments in controlling "neighborhood politics", while at the same
time proposing programs of broader, long-term social impact, implies a
greater reliance on local implementers, and some means of motivating
them to perform more effectively than they have in the past. Several
recurring planning themes have resurfaced, with renewed vigor, as
essential components to programs which envision more active local
involvement. Prominent amoung them are flexibility, participation and
decentralization.
FLEXIBILITY
The World Bank had found that "where both borrowers and Bank staff
have approached implementation with a flexible, problem-solfing attitude,
projects have progressed reasonably well." In a similar context, Caiden
and Wildovsky argue forcefully for flexibility in developing country
budgeting as the only realistic means of accomodating abrupt and
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unforseeable change8 and Albert Hirschman's "hiding hand" principal
makes an eloquent case for the value of ad hoc approaches to unexpected
events and the importance of local creativity in institutionally weak
environments.
Flexibility, it would appear, is a generally acknowledged strategy
for dealing with the uncertainty of complex programs in an unpredictable
environment. At the very least it is a prudent tactic in avoiding
irrevocable commitment to a disasterous course of action. But it runs
counter to basic planning mentality, which relies heavily on the
ability to predict events, and to the smooth operation of rationally
structured organizations, which depend on behavioral consistency. In a
study of Bank behavior, Mattingly, Peattie and Schoen recently deter-
mined that:
"Flexibility is crucial to good project work
because it opens the way for ferreting out
unexpected opportunities in the field, and
because it makes a virtue of the practical
necessity to back away from Bank policies that
can't be made to stick.. .But consistency is
understood as a prerequisite to establishing
credibility both in the field and in the Bank.
The need to be consistent drives the team to
follow BanK policies quite closely."10
If Bank policies allow for little flexibility, procedures are even
more rigidly defined. As projects have become more complex, so have the
attempts to direct borrower behavior. Project management system tech-
niques and control procedures have reached levels of sophistication
difficult to apply even in developed countries. Rondinelli in describ-
ing the impact of "imperious rationality", imposed by donor agencies on
the Third World, claims such procedures to be totally unrelated to the
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political, administrative and cultural conditions of developing countries;
not only unrealistic, but perverse.i Whats more, local administrators
have been quick to learn the formalities of these techniques, to
"play the game", creating an illusion of conformance without substantially
changing their behavior.
Flexibility, or its lack, can also effect project implementation in
more fundamental ways. Many First World donors feel the obligation to
transfer some responsible citizenship along with their funds and have
difficulty in concealing their presumed moral superiority. If their own
views on property rights, the obligations of debtors, corruption and truth
are quite narrow they may encounter frequent misunderstanding. If they
require open confrontation to resolve disputes, they may be misled
into interpreting silence, or bullied affirmation, as assurance that
they've reached agreement.
Excessive, or unnecessary, flexibility may be equally counter-
productive. It may raise doubts about one's convictions or sincerity
and subject one to exploitation. To be effective, flexibility must be
based on a clear perception of program priorities as well as an under-
standing of the local environment. In this regard, the burden falls more
heavily on the outside donor, especially once funds have been committed.
PARTICIPATION
Participation, more specifically community participation, has become
accepted as a necessary component of integrated projects. Like
flexibility, it allows for a wide range of interpretation, is subtle
in its implications and may conflict with other project objectives.
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The World Bank's ambivalent attitude towards community involvement has
been expressed in statements such as: "In come cases community support
has been an effective, though time-consuming, imput," and "While
community involvement can delay and complicate decisions the drawbacks
have been outweighted by the valuable inputs."1 2 The involvement of
targeted beneficiaries appears to be accepted as a necessary nuisance -
a distrubing conclusion, considering their pivotal role in building the
homes, seeking the training, making the monthly payments and voting for
regime which is promoting the program. Precisely what inputs are
expected is also unclear. In two frequently cited examples of
"successful" community involvement, beneficiaries are primarily credited
for ensuring cost recovery in El Salvador while in a similar project
in Zambia they are praised for contributing to the design of the
tertiary road network, although cost recovery was one of the worst in
. . 13
Bank experience.
While there does seem to be a growing awareness that the direct
beneficiaries of a program should be given some decisionary power
over its design, little attention is paid to those responsible for
effecting implementation - the local politicians, technocrats and power
groups. Developmental literature also generalizes about the national
and regional factors which affect policy and programs, but shows less
concern for local determinants. Yet in nations of considerable ethnic
variety, primitive communications, relatively weak intranational
institutions and often specific local interests, the cooperation of
these groups may be a most crucial factor.
Planners are prone to view the preindustrial bureaucracies of
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provinicial developing areas with contempt, though it is not entirely
fair to criticize international donor agencies for shunning them when
they are often treated with obvious disdain by their own national
elites. One may feel justified in holding the entrenched oligarchies
responsible for the gross material and social inequities which charact-
erize these regions, but it seems only reasonable to recognize the
necessity of mobilizing their support, or at least attenuating their
opposition, to programs which affect their interests, to attempt to
understand, rather than merely condemn the motivaticns of these groups,
and to assign them a stake in the outcome.
DECENTRALIZATION
The concerns with community participation and flexibility have be-
come focused on the more objective issue of administrative decentraliza-
tion. Uhile essentially a broader distribution of authority and
responsibility, "decentralization" can take a variety of forms. It may
mean "privatization," the diverstiture of public enterprise, such as is
currently taking place in Argentina; or it may imply "deconcentra-
tion" by which the agencies of central authority are geographically
dispersed, without necessarily decentralizing authority itself, such as
has occurred in some more dynamic developing countries (as well as in
socialist ones). "Devolution" entails the shift, or return, of some
degree of authority to local government, as has been happening in parts
of Asia; and "delegation", the most genuine form of decentralization,
the actual transfer of major decision-making roles to local entities.14
Cynics argue that decentralization moves are little more than
desperate efforts, on the part of shaky central governments to
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extricate themselves from discredited policies. Many however, see a
wider distribution of authority as a realistic approach to generating
local initiative and responsibility. Highly centralized planning,
regardless of its ability to mobilize national resources to GNP grbwth,
has had little success in distributing resources either regionally, or
individually.
Appealing as decentralization is to democratic ideology, the
application of willful, objective oriented endeavors confronts a host of
obstacles in many societies unaccustomed to such autonomy. In evaluat-
ing recent decentralization programs in southern Asia, Cheema and
Rondinelli cite some of the major difficulties: the lack of managerial
talent, overly ambitious goals, reluctance to assur.ie responsibility, lack
of central government support, communications with central government
and donor agencies.15 Nor does local control guarantee beneficiary
participation or flexibility. Ethnic or social groups may be unjustly
excluded and local administrators can be just as rigid as federal
bureaucrats.
On the other hand there are indications that given responsibility,
along with resources, technical support and decisionary powers, even small,
unsophisticated communities can manage their affairs effectively.
De facto decentralization has probably always existed to a greater
extent than officially recognized. While central governments can control
purse strings and issue directives, locals have been quite inventive
in diverting the funds and distorting the orders to their own interests.
Building the necessary institutional capability and accountability into
the lower levels of bureaucracy is obviously a challenge, but one that
must be confronted if responsible performance is demanded there. The
-18-
task may well require the structuring of institutions on local cultural
characteristics rather than the dogmatic imposition of Weberian standards.
DECISION-MAKING SHIFTS
Perhaps the most important implication of these trends in urban
programs is the downward shift of the decision-making locus. This occurs,
on the one hand, due to the progressive increase of case-specific
decisions which arise as implementation proceeds and, on the other,
due to the social and political complexity of integrated programs which
makes objective evaluation of feasible alternatives by outside experts
difficult. In some respects this is true of any project - theory
originates in academia, major donor agencies determine policy, which
recipient national governments adapt to, central technocrats design
programs for local administrators to implement, and final beneficiaries
accept or reject, whatever is thrust upon them. Those who are responsible
for a program's success, its replicability, have little say in its
conception but virtually total control over its implementation. To
use the "actor" analogy, popular in planning circles, the "author",
"producer" and "director" can only hope that those on stage will perform
as they have been instructed to. By the time their decisionary power
becomes evident, the producer's commitment is usually irreversible.
(Unlike a theartical production, however, dress rehearsals are seldom
staged.)
A major difference between infrastructure construction and low-
income housing or employment programs is that, in the former, the social
background and aspirations of project designers and implementers is
likely to be similar; tasks are relatively technological and objective
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and the support of final beneficiaries is not critical to "success."
In the latter, cultural differences come into play. Not only do
beneficiaries have little in common with foreign bankers, but the motiva-
tion of local politicians and technocrats may be at considerable
variance with that of their national counterparts. Opportunities for
crossed signals, accidental or intentional, abound. Those farther
down the chain of command are in a position to either make decisions
themselves, or to filter the information on which decisions are made.
Dependency at this stage has become much more of a two-way affair,
with the outsiders supplying resources and technical assistance and the
local actors a committed effort. While this interdependence may
appear self-evident, it has been frequently ignored. Donor agencies and
their intermediaries have too often relied on their intellectual
arrogance or missionary zeal to motivate acceptable behavior and local
powers have often reacted by subverting or sabotaging programs. Their
ability to do so has certainly been sufficiently demonstrated to establish
their commitment as a crucial element of program implementation. The
challenge then becomes one of engaging the local power structure without
sacrificing basic program objectives.
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CHAPTER II
THE ACTORS: URBAN POWER STRUCTURES
The groups and individuals who have dominated events in Latin
America have not had a good press. The ruling elites are consistently
described as greedy, short-sighted luxury-loving exploiters of sub-
missive masses, and the backwardness of the continent attributed to their
ignoble behavior or even to the Latin character in general. Fagen and
Cornelius are typical in concluding their study of political confronta-
tion in seven Latin countries with the observation that there is no
empicial basis for anticipating a more equitable distribution of material
or political goods in the foreseeable future.I Many Latin political
scientists themselves are equally pessimistic. Those who hold some hope
for progress are apt to place their faith in pressures from below, in the
coersion rather than the cooperation of the dominant power groups.
A more pragmatic approach, it would appear, would be based on an objec-
tive understanding of what motivates the behavior of these groups, to
recognize their limitations and to exploit those attributes which con-
tribute to positive change. Our concern then is not so much with
changing the power structure as with engaging it as it is.
Power structures in Latin America have remained consistently elitist
and corporatist - dominated by small Oegemonious groups - throughout
its modern history. Pluralism, though officially sanctioned by national
constitutions has surfaced in only sporadic and short-lived instances,
while Marxism, increasingly proposed as the only viable remedy for
entrenched inequities, has been unable to mobilize effective support
for the dramatic change envisioned by its proponents. The role of the
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elites has been interpreted in a vardety of ways by different disciplines,
and within them by different ideologies, but two general schools of
thought have come to prominence in developmental planning. One, based
on the structural functional theories pioneered by Weber and Durkheim
represents the liberal, evolutionary view of societal change, by which
universal qualities of entrepreneurship and institution building move
nations foward. One could expect even elites, acting in their broad-
er self interests, to contribute to general progress. Neo-Marxist
dependency theory, however, questions their freedom to act. This view,
promoted by Baran, Frank, and others3 has gained a large number of
adherents in recent years. It claims that underdevelopment is a
structural imposition of the developed nations, their necessity to
maintain a backward "periphery", supplier to cheap raw materials and
consumer of their manufactured products, and that local elites have
little control over local events.
These are the big issues. Their ramifications undoubtedly
penetrate deeply into society, but the farther one moves from global
and national centers of power, the more other factors appear to become
critical: the conflict between traditional landed elites and more pro-
gressive manufacturing - based ones, the relationships within and
between various nierarchies and the coalitions which form and dissolve.
If one assumes as "the elite", those individuals, families, groups
and organizations who retain the bulk of the wealth and decision-making
power, one has to consider a quite heterogeneous body and one in which
individuals are not easily pigeon-holed. T.L. Smith, in describing the
Brazilian elite notes and intellectual braodness of its members, as
compared to U.S. elites.4 A prominent politician may at the same time
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be a practicing engineer, rancher, university lecturer and poet; a
physician, a prominent historian, astromer and owner of the McDonald's
franchise. Smith cites this amplitude of interests as possibly contribut-
ing to the region's backwardness; American elites, by contrast, are
more specialized, focusing on a particular activity and excelling at it.
Nor do political parties provide much of a focus for analysis, affilia-
tions shifting with the winds of personal loyalty and commercial, or
regional, interests more than with ideology. International influence
may bear on power coalitions, but such ties can be cultural, as well as
economic, and xenophobic as well as expansive.
Within this ambiguous structure there are patterns which appear
to be pervasive. They may be institutionalized or not, tied to national
events, or local and relatively rigid or subject to evolution. John
Walton, one author who has done considerable research on local elites,
has found that power is more concentrated in provinical centers of
agriculture than in industrially-based cities, which tend to generate
a higher degree of competition among power groups.5 Francine
Rabinovitz tends to support this generalization and goes on to argue
that local power evolves together with economic development, that the
process produces new coalitions of power while destroying others, that
industrialization splits elites into traditional and progressive fac-
tions and that development tends to separate political from economic
interests.6  Ogliastri and Davila, on the other hand, in analyzing 11
Colombian intermediate cities find the opposite to be the case.7 In
their study they found power to be more concentrated in the more
industrialized cities. Furthermore, they found ideological distinc-
tions between "liberal" and "conservative" to become blurred with
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development, reducing further the issues around which elites might differ.
One significant area of agreement, which is also supported by first
world studies, such as that of Robert Dahl in New Haven,8 is that economic
development tends to shift elitest power from a personalized, political
base to one of more narrow economic interests. Less clear in Latin
America than in the U.S., are the limits of influence and internal
fractionalization of the "economic notables", and who rises to occupy
the political positions they vacate. These questions are particularly
important if one suspects that even economic decisions are often con-
fronted with a variety of options in which social, political and
cultural concerns play a part.
The categorization of Latin power groups also presents some specific
considerations. It is generally accepted that interest groups are
structured in fairly self-contained hierarchical pyramids with the
simplest classification specifying the public sector, private sector
and labor. Accepting the pyramid image (though an up-side-down "T"
might be more appropriate) the three sector grouping seems deceptive,
particularly for provinicial societies. In institutionally fragile
environments the public/private transsectoral movement is so pervasive
that one is prompted to seek other bases for cohesion. Economic or
social class ties may be more useful, but, although reasonably
permanent, they are characterized by greater degrees of heterogeneity
than can comfortably be dealt with in a unit. It would seem that
the source of legitmacy of a group might be a more adequate determinant,
one that implies a relative authority and viability without requiring
either an institutional or ideological basis. What comes to mind
are those groups whose legitimacy transcends local and national events
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as opposed to those who owe their existence to the local political
structure and those who merely exist, with no apparent political or
institutional foundation.
SUPERPOLITICAL ELITES
Certain, identifiable groups appear to be relatively immune to
immediate political and social pressures, their authority derived from
tradition or status located beyond shifting national interests. The
elites considered here are those that have had continuous continent-
wide influence, that direct, more then they react to, events and who
respond to popular demands, if at all, on their own terms.
Probably the most stable institution, throughout Latin America, is
the Catholic church. Priests often preceeded conquistadores into
new regions and have remained a dominant force, politically as well as
spiritually ever since. The Church has been widely condemned as an
instrument of the ruling powers, be they colonial commercial companies
or native planatation owners, in keeping the exploited masses docile.
By and large, this had been its
Today, however, liberation theo
in regard to the rights of the
It has been applied with more v
cities (and more by lower than
in alliance with progressive po
in urban areas as well. Church
the provincial cities, where th
reactionary bourgeoisies still
major effect until the mid 20th century.
logy, which approaches marxist teaching
poor, is a major force for social change.
igor in isolated rural areas than in the
higher echelons of the clergy) but,
litical factions, is beginning to be felt
activism has been least apparent in
e alliance of conservative clergy and
generally prevails. Even so,. it has
become engaged, if only in providing its unassailable stature as a
-25-
shield to those promoting reform. Other factors which are encouraging
the Church to become more active include the growing inroads of
portestantism and spiritualism amoung the middle and lower classes and
increasing activist pressure from European and American Jesuit priests.
The most obviously powerful and resistent elite is the military,
which has been more visible in internal than in external affairs through-
out Latin American history, as the ultimate defense of the oligarchy.
The army is seen as a stabilizing force in many countries, almost as
a bastion of democracy and it has indeed used its unique powers to bring
nations back on course when they have veered too far left, or even right.
But most often it has represented, or created, oppressive dictatorships.
Nevertheless there are hints of change. The time has passed in much of
the continent when every prominent family felt obligated to produce at
least one priest, one doctor and one soldier. The uniform, like the
cassock, has lost some of its lustre and the military has become
increasing middle class in makeup. Progressive regimes in Venezuela and
Colombia owe much of their coming to power to the support of younger
dissident officers and other countries, such as Brazil, are beginning
to feel the pressures of reform minded soldiers. At the provincial
level, federal troops are likely to be viewed with ambiguity: a
ostentatious symbol of repression, to radicals; a protective if somewhat
uncomfortable presenceto politicians, a sometimes frightening but
competent authority, to the populace at large, noted for greater
discipline and less corruption than the local, police. The mixed feelings
were illustrated to a group of social researchers interviewing squatters
shortly after the military police had physically obliterated a near-by
settlement. The repondents, who lived in houses without water or
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sewerage, and were very aware of the police action, cited police
protection, and specifically that of the military police, high on their
list of demands.9
Professional alliances constitute another.elite which considers
itself above politics, although it is often quite selective. Civil
engineering for instance, not a particularly high status occupation
in developed countries, has a very prominent role in Latin America.
Hirschman describes the powerful influence engineers had over politicians
in defining policies for Brazil's drought-prone Northeast 0 and Gaken-
heimer has shown the ability of these professionals to dominate planning
through the most varied regimes in Chile. 1  In Rio de Janeiro, an
invitation to speak to the Clube de Engenharia is close to the epitome
of prestige. Nor is their close association with the construction
industry grounds for suspicion as it might be in other parts. Civil
Engineers have been able to assume a mantle of apoliticality and
authority which places them in an almost unassailable position.
Architects, on the other hand, journalists, lawyers, and to a lesser
degree, physicians and scientists are likely to be associated with more
radical social causes. All of the professions maintain strong national,
and international, "ties of class" which place them above the nitty-
gritty of local politics. These ties also expose them to increasing-
ly critical first world opinion and it is becoming common for professional
entities to issue statements on current political issues. Constantly
wider access of the middle classes and women to professional training
no doubt contributes further to the professions' increased participa-
tion in politics.
Latin America has always had a thriving intellectual community.
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Unlike North America, cultural refinement and academic endeavors have
been highly respected, even by those with little opportunity to pursue
them. The provinces abound with literary scientific, historic and
geographic academies. Relying heavily on Europe for inspiration and
guidance the intellectual elite has consistently maintained an aloof
attitude towards local affairs. With rare exceptions, the political
events of France and Germany have occupied their attention more than
those of Latin America, and those intellectuals who have addressed
Latin issues are more likely to find receptive audiences abroad than at
home, such as has been the case of those responsible for the
incisive thinking of the Economic Commission on Latin America, in the
1960's. This seemingly impervious intellectual elite, or at least
significant portions of it, is losing some of its alientation. The "dual
dualism" of which Jorge Ahumada speaks - the dualism of traditional and
progressive values superimposed on that of both dominant and submissive
classes12 - is bringing about some fractionalization of this group.
The access to higher education, of those outside the traditional elites,
together with international interest in global development is creating
a body of socially active intellectuals. With little familial or
economic loyalty to the dominant classes this faction is acquiring
an increasingly dominant voice in academia, and while rhetoric and
action are still subject to considerable independency in Latin America,
the association of social scientists and peasant or labor groups is
becoming more prevalent. Exile or harrassment by a repressive regime
has even come to confer a special status in some academic quarters, and
popular music and black culture are becoming legitimate areas of study.
International donor agencies have become another major influence.
While ostenibly respecting national sovereigntives, they promote
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the attitudes of first world planners and often, the economic and political
interests of the nations which fund them. At their most basic level
these agencies are merely banks lending money and concerned
primarily with the security of their loans. The situation becomes more
complex however as ideology, political influence, and paternalism comes
into play. Borrowers are anxious to satisfy the real, or perceived,
conditions of the lenders,and lenders feel impelled to use their bargain-
ing power to induce behavioral change. There is considerable illusion
in this relationship in that the intentions of the borrower are both
difficult to discern and to control, while the lender may have strong
incentives to "push money" and little stake in its effective
application. Nevertheless, foreign agencies do have a substantial say
in the types of policies and projects acceptable for funding and thus
influence national and local bureaucratic behavior. They have further
effect, during implementation, through their technical experts, whose
authority and apolitical status provides them with special opportunities
for influencing local groups. they may, for instance, through establish-
ing rapport with the politicians and technocrats directly responsible
for a project, substantially aid and enhance the status of these in-
dividuals, perhaps at the expense of national level actors. They may
use their special position to build communication between antagonistic
groups, or, by remaining aloof, reenforce the distrust and defensive-
ness that often characterizes the attitude of local bureaucrats.
BUREAUCRATIC HIERARCHIES
Although it is impossible to distinguish absolutely between super-
political, political and non-political groups, certain ones are much
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more susceptible to the fluctuations of the immediate political temper
than others. They determine less than they react to conditions and they
tend to be highly visible. Such groups include government
bureaucracies, political parties and institutionalized interest groups.
In the non-pluralistic societies of Latin America these groups usually
depend on the superpolitical elites, for whom they may be little iore
than mouth pieces, for their existence. However, their viability also
depends on satisfying a variety of changing demands from elite and non-
elite groups and in balancing these various interests they often find
opportunity to act with considerable autonomy.
Political parties cover the spectrum from extreme right to extreme
left, though ideological distinctions often shift or become blurred.
Most parties represent limited constituencies, requiring the formation
of coalitions to achieve any major political objective, and these
coalitions are often built on very tenuous and temporary common interests.
According to Ahumada, the fragility of these "marriages of convenience"
is the disassociation of power, without consensus on goals - dividing
the cake without basic agreement on policies or priorities to be pursued.13
As a result these countries are subject to periods of apparent pluralism
where middle class parties with widespread popular support manage
political affairs while economic power is retained by entrenched elites.
If the politicians become unmanageable, the military steps in to pro-
tect economic interests. The effect of these cycles is more strongly
felt at the national level and in the larger, industrialized cities
than in the provinices, where, as Ogliastri and Davila have pointed
out, a more personal, non-economic loyalty prevails, one which is less
subject to the vaguaries of party politics. Parties in such circumstances
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serve primarily in providing legitimacy to established power groups,
and a rallying point for coalitions during elections. In the rare
cases in which parties have achieved long term political dominance,
such as in Mexico and Cuba, this position has only been retained through
appeasement or absorption of the military and economic powers in what
amounts to dictatorial national regimes rather than a spontaneous coal-
ition of interests. More common are short-lived alliances, united under
a banner of "social democracy", which prove incapable of satisfying their
own conflicting internal demands, much less those of the nation, and
eventually deteriorate to the point where the more reactionary forces
fell compelled to step in and restore order.
Unreliable, fluid and confused as party politics is, it does manage
to create a degree of consolidation among the upper echelons of the
administrative bureaucracy which links national to state and local
government. Those local administrations too inflexible, or too
independent, to move with party shifts at the national level will
undoubtedly be short-changed in the allocation of national transfers
and denied valuable channels of communication to federal programs. Weak
institutional linkages and constantly fluctuating national policies make
personal, party-associated ties crucial to a local administrators ability
to perform. When properly cultivated, they also keep him informed of,
and prepared to adjust to, forthcoming shifts in policy and personalit-
ies.
An increasingly visible faction within the administrative
bureaucracy is that composed of technocrats. As centralized national
planning has gained acceptance in Latin America, it has given rise to
this new elite whose authority, loyalties and spheres of competence
are not defined by tradition. Technocrats have been effective in
-31-
establishing themselves as the embodiment of rational, progressive
values and as disinterested bystanders in social class conflicts. Their
central role in the definition and administration of public policy
constitutes a threat to traditional political elites and a hope to
those who champion structural change. Benveniste analyses the growing
dependence of society as a whole, and political leaders in particular,
on priveleged experts knowledge and the intricate maneuvering which
takes place between "prince and pundit.",4 On a national scale, Brazil
is a case in point in which the planning technocracy has out maneuvered
the political process as well as a reactionary military regime in acquir-
ing control of the economy. Nor do technocrats there feel obliged to
play a low-profile advisory role. Planning minister "Czar" Delfim
Neto, and his policies are discussed by the man in the street, who might
be hard pressed to name the various presidents under whom Delfim has
"served".
Technocrats appear to acquire a special mystique in societies where
public scrutiny of self-proclaimed authority is successfully suppressed.
Theirs is an authority derived from the possession of exclusive and super-
ior knowledge - knowledge imported from nations who already have much
of what developing areas aspire to. Their knowledge is also per-
ceived to be objective - free of the value laden judgement which
affects politicians, soldiers and intellectuals. Technocrats themselves
seem to share this view. They display (more or less overtly) disdain
for the traditional, politicized oligarchies and establish their own
local and national neworks, They command information, proceedures and
jargon which is shared at their will and they are relatively immune to
popular opinion. Benveniste concludes that "mounting a ladder of proof
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based on its own untested convictions, an elite of experts and planners
can acquire far more influence on the course of events than those who
hired them ever intended them to have, and that [planning failures]
include those of experts who acquire too much power, happen to make
mistakes, and are surprised to discover that the narrow and technical
definition of their role was inadequate and led them to disregard widely
shared values."15
The lack of appreciation of operative values occurs on national, as
well as on international, levels in centrally directed development pro-
grams. Highly-trained (often foreign educated) national planners may
have a better grasp of economic and management theory than of
particular local aspirations and feel more comfortable with first world
colleagues than with their provincial counterparts. The technocracy
has produced its own dualism, in which cosmopolitan federal officials
cannot always communicate effectively with those at state or city level.
These latter are likely to hail from the middle class and, lacking the
family connections to enter business at the top, frequently accept
positions in public service. With the authority of a degree but with-
out established ties to the traditional elites they may harbor strong,
and radical, convictions concerning their role in furthering the
interests of the oppressed. These new technocrats provide a unique
conduit between federal and foreign program promoters and targeted
beneficiaries. This position allows them considerable opportunity to
inject their own ideologies into the flow of information, protected from
undue interference from their political superiors by the mantle of
technical objectivity. .We had. tne opportunity to observe how such a
group of technocrats, the local administrative unit of a World Bank
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sponsored urban development program in Brazil, consistently by-passed
the political-ministerial chain of command to deal directly with the
parastatal corporations who controlled disbursement of the funds.16
Of all the actors with a stake in development programs, the local
technocrats appear to be assuming an ever more pivotal, and often
insufficiently appreciated role.
NON-POLITICAL ALLIANCES
The groups mentioned so far are not, of course, entirely homogeneous
entities. What makes them identifiable is their possessing some form
of vertical integration, whether it be through an institutionalized
hierarchy or not. In some cases, such as in the Church or the military
this structure is well articulated, in others - the professional or
academic elites, for instance, it is more subtle. Still, members have
a fairly definite notion of where they stand - who they can influence and
who they must respect. Transcending these groups are other ties which
function on a more horizontal plane, their effectiveness determined by
their consensus on broad issues and which provide the basis for
cementing alliances between the hierarchies in their pursuit of specific
objectives. Accepting Larissa Lomnitz's thesis that "politics is the
art of manipulating horizontal solidarities against vertical ones"1 7
and that the vertical solidarities are structured within relatively self-
contained pyramids, then the horizontal ones constitute a complex web of
linkages which attach the pyramids to one another.
Common economic interest would naturally be one of the stronger
attachments. But it is also a potent generator of competition and
factionalization,and while economic powers may sometimes unite in power-
e.
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ful alliances they are as often engaged in devisive conflict. Latin
America has been characterized, and caricaturized, by the hegemony of
its omnipotent oligarchies - traditionally the autocratic plantation
owner and more recently the urban industrialists, or financiers. -While
these groups obviously occupy the pinnacle of wealth in societies of
widespread poverty, their role in promoting or in thwarting progress
is less clear; nor should their homogeneity be taken for granted. Large
rural landowners do, as a group, hinder equity and progress. They can
be held responsible for the demonstrably inefficient use of agricultural
land and for practices which keep most of the rural population in a
state of serfdom. It can be hoped, perhaps expected, that the pressure
of rapidly expanding populations, concerns with urban immigration and
calls for peaceful, or violent, land reform will eventually dislodge
this elite. Government sponsored colonization programs and land
taxation designed by evermore urban oriented national governments should
also contribute to increased efficiency and distribution. Progress
may be slow, but the generally positive thrust seems irreversible.
The urban based oligarchy is criticized for its lack of
entrepreneurship, subordination to foreign interests and inefficient
management. As it becomes more sophisticated, it should begin to
appreciate the advantages of progress to its own self interest.
Commerce and manufacturing evidently benefit from development, at the
very least, the former from increased purchasing power and the latter
from more efficient infrastructure and trained labor. The possible costs
of more expensive labor or more effective public administration are more
than offset by the gains. Specific interests in particular inter-
ventions may well generate conflict, but in such cases resolution
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may depend more on the political ability of promoters than on any need to
reconcile basic differences in objective. A major accusation against
local economic interests has been their propensity to divert, distort
or usurp the benefits of development for their own purposes. This may
be largely true, but to the extent that these elites share at least
some local aspirations with the community as a whole and possess the
ability to attract, generate and apply resources, they constitute a vital
element of the process. It becomes the task of others - government,
church or reformer to guide their capabilities toward broader goals.
More has been said than revealed about the emergent middle class
of Latin America. Industrialization and urbanization have undoubtedly
produced a growing population which is neither very rich nor very poor,
but to what degree this group heralds the dawn of pluralism is still
cloudy. It has come to pervade public administration, constitute the
bulk of the military, church, academic and professional pyramids and to
provide the backbone of nascent consumer societies, yet it seems unable
or unwilling to find a voice of its own. Much depends on how one defines
"middle class" - an enormous range of incomes if one takes, say, the 35%
of the population below the wealthiest 5%, or an absurdly small group
if one takes those who command the middle 50% of wealth. In the
latter class identification is likely to be less strong than the ambi-
tion of making it into the priveledged class. Even in the lower
strata of the "large middle class," consolidating one's distance from the
poor may be a stronger motivation than seeking solidarity with ones
peers. Fagen and Cornelius emphasize the essential conservatism of
the middle class in its participation in electoral politics in South
America and warn that expectations of finding the seeds of liberalism
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and democracy in this group are unfounded.18 Others do perceive elements
of pluralism in new and broader based coalitions, in which portions
of the middle class together with labor and some elitist factions
unite behind a common interest. Programs which favor general regional
interests, such as ones involving massive transfers of funds from the
national government, for example, can catalyze such alliances.
Then there are the masses who are the primary focus of integrated
urban development planning. Peering through all the theory, rhetoric,
ideology, good intentions, and misinformation it is virtually impossible
to form a coherent view. At the one extreme is a seemingly endless body
of undernourished, unemployed, unhoused, hopeless humanity; at the other,
individuals coping as best they can in a not very hospitable environment.
Their identification as a group is based on their poverty, which
supposedly gives them a commonality of interest, while their power is
derived from their large numbers. Attempts to mobilize this power to
effective political purpose have been repeatedly frustrated; the radical
rallying cries they might be expected to heed have gone largely ignored.
This reluctance to further their own apparent well-being has been
attributed to both apathy and a deeply ingrained conservatism.19 The
latter is more convincing in that radical change implies a certain
risk which those living close to the limits of subsistence may not
feel they can afford. To the degree that they are manipulable by
politicians, the incumbent elites, as the dispensors of what patronage
is available, have a distinct advantage over radical reformers.
Though it may be wishful thinking to expect active support from the
masses, on the part of those who envision abrupt and decisive social
change, it would be equally unwise to discount their potential. In the
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first place their sheer numbers and their visibility due to the
intensity of urban concentration in Latin America, must give pause to
any regime which relies on repression. It is rapidly becoming
unnecessary to incite the poor as a group; any one of a number of
factions is capable of posing serious threats to stability. Furthermore,
what industrialization is taking place is giving rise to a laboring
class sufficiently above the starvation level to be able to risk a bit
of uncertainty and sufficiently informed to be capable of being organiz-
ed. The essential conservatism, and awe of the system, of this class
may be more vunerable to the appeals of radical reformers. While history
should make one wary of predicting social revolution in Latin America,
regardless of the apparent ripeness of the situation, one cannot ignore
the unprecedented composition of urban populations and the speed with
which the composition is changing, in provincial, as well as in
metropolitan areas.
Familial and ethnic ties are frequently cited as sources of
horizontal linkage, along with substantial documentation of their
abuse. The factors which reinforce such bonds - large patriarchal
families, living in relative isolation, in sometimes hostile, and often
lawless, environments have instilled deep-rooted reliance
on personal loyalty. While such relationships are condemmed in modern
western society as incompatible with merit-based organizational
structure, they must be recognized as pervasive elements of Latin
American institutional life; not only bonds established by blood and
national origin, but also spontaneous friendship. In the words of a
popular bureaucratic dictum: "to my friends: everything; to the public
at large: the law; to my enemies: nothing."
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The position of women has received little attention. The macho
mystique has largely obscured the traditional roles of women,
significant as they have been, and there has been little overt feminism
to promote or to publicize more recent influence. Yet today, women con-
stitute a greater proportion of the professions - doctors, lawyers,
engineers, etc. in Latin American than in the United States. The strong
family ties that characterize Latin societies have always given the mother
a dominant, even revered, position in forming the moral and intellectual
values of the offspring, as well as considerable authority over social
and religious issues which males traditionally shunned. The main-
tenance of a low profile has belied the extent to which females
individually, and through widespread solidarity have made their
presence felt. The concern for social equity which has been introduced
into developmental planning, together with the prominence of females
in academia and in the technocracy, makes them an ever more apparent
force in urban politics. The Praia Grande project (described in the
following chapter) came to rely heavily on two dynamic ladies at one
point and it is unlikely that the present Argentinian government would
have acted forcefully in prosecuting former military torturers
without the pressure applied by the wives and mothers of their victims.
In summary, it appears that Latin power structures are neither as
homogeneous nor as class antagonistic as they are frequently
depicted. There are also indications that the traditional coalitions
on which oligarchic power has depended may be becoming destabilized,
through external pressures, through nascent industrialization and, at
least in urban areas, through the sheer numbers of the non-elite
population. There is no assurance that the power shifts in progress
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will produce positive change, but there is sufficient evidence of positive
motivation and capability to provide a basis for guarded optimism.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIENCE: THREE DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS
The identification of concentrations of power is a straightforward
task compared to understanding their relative impacts on the environments
within which they act. The labyrinth of motivations, of expressed and
hidden acendas, of shifting alliances and of intended and accidental
results necessarily injects a substantial dose of subjectivity into any
evaluation. At best, one can hope to supplement observation with
cautious amounts of conjecture and logic in an attempt to discern
recurring patterns.
What follows here is a review of three programs, one each
in Colombia, Mexico and Brazil, with the intent of determining the effect
of the principal actors on outcome and the means by which they achieved
their influence. The cases are similar in that they involve
innovative efforts to address longstanding problems, they have well-
defined objectives, visible promotors and effective opposition. They
differ in the source of their legitimacy as well as in the specifics and
scope of their objectives. While it would oe foolhardy to characterize
this, or any, set of cases as "typical" these three programs are at
least relevent in that they feature some of the more prominent actors in
Latin developmental endeavors: rural and urban economic elites, a strong
central government, technocrats and mid-level reform mongers.
The success or failure of the programs is of interest only to the
extent that the effectiveness of competing interests can be judged
against progress toward broad policy goals. Specifically, an attempt
will be made to answer the following questions: Who were the dominant
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power groups? What motivated them? and, How did they achieve their
objectives?
THE CAUCA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT
The essence of the issues which have characterized the development
of Cali, Colombia and its environs during the past 25 years is the
classic conflict of emergent, progressive urban-based elites and the
traditional landed gentry. One side, the progressives, has quite clear-
cut, rational objectives which promise benefit for all, even for the
agriculturists, and broad based support, managerial talent and the tide
of history to boot, the other, little more than fear, tradition and
wealth. National politics, foreign business interests and intellectuals
enter the fray at various stages, and with varying effect to alter the
course of events.
Cali is the major city of ths upper Cauca Valley in Western Colombia,
a region which has been rich in cattle and sugar cane since early colonial
days, and, more recently in coffee as well. The opening of the Panama
Canal and rail connections to the nearby port of Buenaventura and to
other valley cities, in the early 20th century, stimulated Cali's
growth as the commercial center of the region. Snall scale industrial-
ization, initially of food products, followed by textiles and paper, also
became concentrated there. Something of an industrial boom took place
after World War II with the number of manufacturing establishments
increasing seven-fold between 1945 and 1953 and continuing at about the
same pace into the mid 1960's.1 After a period of stagnation industrial-
ization picked up again in the later 1960's. The process induced very
rapid urbanization, with Cali iteslf growing from 280,000 in 1950 to
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over 1.5 million in 1980 and the valley to over 4 million.
Much of the initial industrialization was controlled by the large land
owners of the region, but in the post-war boom outsiders became influential
as well as did foreign, mainly North American, business. By 1965 the
valley contained 20% of Columbia's industry, 40% of it foreign owned. 2
North American influence also intruded in more subtle ways. Develop-
mental planning and the mystique of rapid industrial growth had captured
the imagaination of Cali's more progressive elite. One man in particular,
Jose Castro Borrero, new industrialist, son of wealthy land owners and
part-time politician, began to form plans for a Latin version of the
Tennessee Valley Authority. he promoted the scheme relentlessly, inviting
in David Lilienthal, father of the T.V.A., as consultant and, in the mid
1950's, established an autonomous regional development corporation, the
C.V.C. His goal was to stimulate industrial as well as agricultural develop-
ment through the provision of large-scale infrastructure projects -
electrification, flood control, irrigation and highways. C.V.C. backers
were intent that their program be free from interference from the central
government and proposed that its operational financing be though taxa-
tion of rural land. In addition to producing revenue, this taxation
would encourage wider distribution, and greater productivity of what were
notoriously inefficient and undercultivated large agricultural properties. 3
The "latifundiarios" reacted with passion. Although they would
benefit directly from many of the program's components, not to mention in-
creased property values, they were neither willing to foot the bill, nor
to give up their presumed bithright (modest land reform a 'decade later
did force them to give up sone of the holdings). The ensuing
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battle was fought between two very small elites: 43% of the land was
owned by 2% of the land owners and Walton has identified a mere 21
"influentials" as dominating urban decision-making. Nor were there
"influentials" entirely of a mind. Dispute over the scope and urgency of
program components ensued between aggressive boosters, demanding pro-
gress at any cost and moderates, many of whom had family and social ties
with the landed gentry.
The national government maintained a neutral position in this battle
of local titans and the local bureaucracies, which were dominated by
lesser, notoriously ineffectual, elites were left to watch from the side-
lines. Other potential participants, including the church, labor, the
populace at large, and small farmers generally applauded the progressives
but offered no substantial support. 4
The C.V.C. was hampered by its aloof treatment of local government,
in being unable to coordinate its investments with that of the public
sector. The politicians, aware of their inferior status, and anxious
to display what little autonomy they had, were often uncooperative.
Ironically, the rural elite was prone to support the progressives in
their battles with the officials over where to build roads or sewer
lines. When outsiders challenged their decision-making monopoly the
oligarchy managed to bury the hatchet.
The corporation did produce results, but at a rate unsatisfactory
to a new generation of progressive elite. These "young Turks", well
educated sons of the earlier industialists, decided that neither the
narrow interests represented by organizations like the Industrialists'
Association nor the ineffectual public sector were adequate to the task,
and sought alliance, and their own legitimacy, with the University. The
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Universidad del Valle, founded in 1945 with Rockefeller Foundation fund-
ing did not suffer from the tradition-bound scholasticism of older
Latin institutions and embarked enthusiastically on a program of practical
business management training. As described by one of its promotors,
"The program must be aimed at 'movers' and 'shapers'. In any society or
region there are a few men at the top of the 'strategic human capital'
pyramid who set the environmental stage. They are the individuals who,
if they put their minds to it, can transform society from within and from
the top down without tearing it apart through conflict. It is these men,
and only these who, through their involvement and leadership, can root
a development program in the local soil, create the climate in which it
will flourish and give it the kind of nourishment that will bring it long-
range growth and vigor. 5 Well, this was 1964; the Universidad del Vale
had then, and has had since, programs of a broader social view, but the
statement is indicative or how deeply entrenched the progressive's
perpective had become, and howreven prestigious, autonomous institutions
are subject to mobilization within quite narrow, clientist interests.
Too narrow, in the view of yet another group of more progressive
progressives, who by the early 1970's had splintered off to form a
competing promotional agency centered around a different set of organiza-
tions. The tactics and the alliances shifted once again, but the same
interests, the same elite, continued on essentially the same course.
Two decades of determined effort on the part of the progressive
elite went far in transforming the upper Cauca Valley from feudalism to
capitalism. One can debate the value of their accomplishment, but one
can't deny that Cali had become a major industrial center. Power was
very visibly concentrated in a small, private, status elite, motivated by
-45-
a clear view of its own interests, which it effectively communicated as
the interests of the region. Despite internal conflicts, its confrontation
by an equally powerful elite, its shunning of the public sector and fre-
quent frustration of its immediate objectives it was able to maintain
a momentum of enthusiasm and conviction. Beyond its own capacity, it
relied on only a few, select coalitions. American business interests were
a potent silent partner at the outset, the University when broader
legitimacy was required, and the national government sporadically to pro-
vide legislation and funds. This elite also had brute power, history and
the planning mystique on its side, but even these were only tools,
effectively manipulated to forward what was essentially a result of the
unshakeable faith of a handful of true believers.
THE CONASUPO FOOD PROGRAM IN MEXICO
This story is centered on a vast national program, sponsored by a
strong authoritarian government and administered by an extensive, well-
trained corps of professional bureaucrats. The conflicts which arise
during its implementation and the coalitions necessary to confront them
are more widespread and less clearly drawn than in the Cauca Valley and
require a high degree of political ability on the part of its advocates.
We are particularly concerned with the behavior of the mid-echelon
administrators whose job it is to coordinate the complex array of
political, economic and social interests which determine the programs
application at the local level. These implementers are of the new breed,
the technocrats, whose authority derives from their organizational
legitimacy and their personal expertise. These qualities, however,
prove insufficient to get the job done and force them into a position,
-46-
not altogether defined, bUt apparently crucial to functioning effectively
in an environment of institutional amibiguity.
CONASUPO is the acronym for Compania Nacional de Subisistencias
Populares, a federal agency established in the 1960's to regulate the
pricing of "basic necessities". Its sphere of influence has expanded
from basic foods and clothing to include household and school supplies,
building materials, toys, farm implements and other items. In addition
to its regulatory role, it employs over 8,000 people and consumes over
5% of the national budget in the purchasing, storage, processing and
retailing of food staples, through a nation-wide chain of 2,500 fair price
stores.6
The agency was established to correct what were perceived as serious
malfunctions of the market in the distribution and price stability of
food staples - an ambitious public intervention made possible only by
Mexico's all powerful central regime. Nevertheless, it is not surprising
that the agency has encountered constant and determined opposition from
a wide range of economic interests with which it competes. Resistence
on a broader scale is founded in the disapprobation, if not open contempt,
in which public enterprise is held in Mexico,where socially-oriented
programs are generally considered the most susceptible to inefficiency,
corruption, partisanship and vunerability to vested interests.7  The
size, and scope of its mandate make CONASUPO an especially attractive
target for suspicion and accusation.
The officials most responsible for building the agencies credibility
and for assuring its effective operation are its local managers. These
mid-,level bureaucrats are responsible for overcoming the opposition of
local businessmen, accomodating the politicians, garnering the cooperation
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of various elites and satisfying the demand of their low-status clientele.
They are, of course, constrained by general policy set in the capital
and the bureaucratic exigencies of the agency, but have a high degree of
autonomy over the allocation of resources, implementation approaches,
staffing and dealing with the local power structure.
These individuals hail from the relatively new elite of "tecnicos",
a type which is becoming increasingly visible in public administration in
Mexico, as elsewhere. CONASUPO has made an effort to build a technically
competent staff of administrators with backgrounds in economics, business
administration agronomy, accounting, etc. to a substantial depth within
the organization, and to function on an approximation of Weberian norms.
This is not to imply that friendship, kinship and political ties no
longer play a role, but that in themselves, they are insufficient in
gaining a position of authority within the agency. Grindle has found that
with the exception of the top-most levels of the hierarchy party affilia-
tion seems to have relatively little bearing on staffing. Other link-
ages are more difficult to evaluate in that the tecnicos belong to the same
elites that dominate most of public and private life in the country.
Still, they possess a new qualification - that of a professional degree -
and one which is not common in the environment in which many of them act.
Another qualification, and one not normally attributed to their class,
is widespread commitment to a socially significant program. If for no
other reason than professional advancement they must tend to the demands
of the low income population and many display more altruistic motiva-
tions.
It is within this context, of influential opposition in a highly
politicized environment, that the tecnico, with special knowledge as his
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authority, must attempt to operate. One of his first tasks is to establish
close working relationships with the local government. The politicians
are, of course, interested in using the national program for their own
purposes - taking credit for its successes at election time, ingratiating
themselves with the party leader's in the capital, and dissociating
themselves when its activities conflict with local business interests.
They can be helpful too, in advising when and where new stores can be
opened with little risk of opposition, who has to placated, or from which
distributor it would be wise to make at least a token purchase.
The CONASUPO manager cannot afford to be arrogant with the pro-
vinicials despite his representing the federal government. His autonomy
carries with it a major responsibility in fomenting political harmony.
In the single party regime which governs Mexico the exposure of internal
conflict can be very damaging to the careers of politicians and
technocrats alike. The system places a heavy burden on the federal agent
to resolve local differences, or to at least assure that they are not
noticed in the capital. 9
Another crucial faction he has to cope with is the local business
community, especially that which distributes and retails food staples.
To them he may well appear to represent subsidized competition and a real
threat. It is incumbent upon him to establish dialogue through chambers
of commerce and other business associations, to convince them of their
mutual interests. He can, for instance, sell them produce from the
agency's regulatory reserves at reduced prices, and do it selectively;
he can award transportation contracts and he can locate new stores in
areas that will have little impact on existing merchants. Primarily he
must convince them that CONASUPO is a fact of life and that cooperation
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is their wisest policy.
He also has to give at least some satisfaction to his clients.
While they have little opportunity, between elections, to articulate
their demands, his performance is eventually evaluated on the amount of
product he moves. The popular nature of the program has caused informa-
tion on its objectives to be widely diffused and there is probably no
other government program which has created such high expectations, nor
one in which the poor have as many allies - the middle class, the
10
national government and organized labor - demanding results.
In attempting to reconcile these often conflicting demands, the
CONASUPO administrator is likely to behave more as a political survivor
than a technical expert. Much depends on his own career ambitions,
ideological stance and to whom he owes his loyalties. Those who are
appointed through their connections to the national bureaucracy tend to
be most intent on pushing through the-agency's current policy, less
sensitive to local interests and hindered in their ability to mobilize these
interests. Those who gain their position through local political ties may
see their future linked more to these than to national priorities. They
may have greater facility in dealing with the prevailing power structure,
and may in fact represent it, while having more difficulty in maintain-
ing their institutional backing. Both have to recognize the implications
of the six-year administrative cycle which revamps the staffing of all
bureaucracies, and their "appointee" status, which makes them subject
to "release" at any time. Grindle quotes the CONASUPO manager's own
evaluation of their position as a highly politicized one in which they
are required to curry favor from within and without the organization in
promoting their personal ambitions as well as those of the program.''
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Some appear to achieve a worKable balance between career and public
interests while others submit to political expediency or corruption,
which seriously compromise their effectiveness.
CONASUPO's own ambitious policies contribute to'the dilemas confront-
ing provinicial managers. A major, long standing issue within the
agency is its determination to provide low-cost food to urban labor while
concurrently improving the lot of the rural, food producing, peasant.
The program had been consistentl, domin.ted by a strong urban bias, when,
in the early 1970's it was decided to address the rural problem more
aggressively. Local managers were placed in the awkward position of
catering to the politically weak, and administratively inefficient
scurce, the small farmer, while maintaining constant low-cost supplies to
the cities. In an attempt to circumvent this conflict, a separate agency,
the Field Coordination Program was established to mobilize peasants at
the village level, that they themselves world articulate demands on
CONASUPO from below.12 The peasants, however, unaccustomed to being
invited into the decidion-making process and skeptical of any real change
in the system they had long been subjected to, saw the new officials as
merely one more link in the bureaucratic chain, albeit one to which they
had more access, and attempted to employ them as intermediaries in reach-
ing the power structure on any issue. Rather than encouraging grass-
roots mobilization, the field managers came to be employed as brokers by
the low-income groups. While they were in a position to do some good,
assuming their heart was in the right place, they were seriously compromised
by their obligations to both client and patron. This seems to be the
fate of technocrats in Mexico - an obligation to carry out nationally
mandated reform within a political structure which permits little room
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for maneouver. The more creative implementers do discover breaches in
the system and do make limited progress, but even they are required to
expend an inordinate amount of effort inbalancing conflicting interests.
Equity, and the mobilization of the forces to achieve it, assumes a
somewhat surrealistic quality in the highly centralized, authoritarian
and paternalistic political structure of Mexico. While the traditional,
concentrated power structures persist, they are increasingly subject to
the influence of the politicized technocrats whose behavior appears to
be dictated by a different mix of aspirations. They embody a more
ambitious, open-minded and professionally oriented spirit than that which
has guided the older oligarchies. They may be no more willing to share
political power and status, but they do display a determination to
achieve greater economic and social equity. Their continuous ascendency
within the governmental hierarchy provides a basis for cautious optimism.
THE PRAIA GRANDE PROGRAM IN NORTHEAST BRAZIL
This case is intended to illustrate the complexity of interests
that come into play in even relatively modest developmental efforts and
ones in which the stakes are not clearly perceived. The program's pro-
motors had neither political nor economic power, their loyalties were
ambiguous and their support subject to frequent shifts. Opposition too
was disorganized, tending to coalesce around suspected, more than actual,
threats. The fluidity of the situation provided unique possibilities
as well as unifor seen constraints, requiring a high degree of flexibility
on the part of a small group of technocrats determined to sell an
untried idea. Their behavior alternated between manipulation and
arrogance in what became largely a game of seizing targets of opportunity.
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Sao Luis is the capital city of the state of Maranhao, on Brazil's
northeast coast approximately where the semi arid Northeast meets the
Amazon rain forest. It passed through French and Dutch hands before be-
coming the administrative, and commercial, seat of a Portuguese province
the size of Western Europe. During the 17th and 18th centuries it became
the thriving center of export for the sugar and cotton of the region
and one of the continent's richest and most beautiful cities - "La Ville
des Petits Palais de Porcelain" in the words of a prominent 19th century
French visitor and in reference ot the abundance of porcelain tile
faced buildings. 13
With the abolition of slavery in the 1880's, heavy competition from
the Caribbean and other factors, Maranhao's economy entered a continuous
downward spiral. Planation owners took to poetry and politics, living off
investments outside the province, as cash crops gave way to subsistency
farming of rice and mandioc. The last textile mill closed in the 1950's.
While Maranhao was reduced to the poorest of Brazil's poor northeastern
states, Sio Luis acquired the distinction of the country's only major
city to retain a downtown of unadulterated colonial architecture - a
combination of misery and decaying beauty. UNESCO had recognized the fact
and twice presented recommendations for restoring the historic central
core; the federal government declared a 50 heltare tract to be national
patrimony and thus protected from physical alteration. To no avail;
the physical as well as the economic deterioration continued. In 1978
an itinerent American architect, under the auspices of the State
Secretary of Planning prepared a proposal which emphasized the economic
and social, as well as the cultural, potential of the most thoroughly
deteriorated area. 14 Prompted by the publicity this proposal received in
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Southern Brazil, the Gcvernor convened a panel of national experts to
recommend approaches; a commission was composed of the representatives
of seven federal, state and municipal agencies to define policy and a
task force of technocrats established to coordinate design and implemen-
tation. The state, as sponsor, was interested in attracting federal funds
for any reason and this program seemed to have some possibilities:
cultural preservation, infrastructure, port improvements and tourism, as
well as placating a persistent clamor from the intellectual community
that something be done to preserve Praia Grande, as the old central city,
adfacent to the waterfront, was called.
The experts went home, the Governor turned to more pressign matters
and the commission members, who didn't share great common interests, or
much mutual respect wither, felt that the Planning Secretary, who had
initiated the whoel thing, should assume the major responsibility. He,
in turn, had been more or less badgered into assuming the initiative by
the original promoters, now the task force, and felt ne had fulfilled
his oblicaticns for the time being. This left the task force with a
green light to proceed, but without any real authority, funding or
support from above.
In the mean time resistance had been building. The intellectual-
cultural elite which had come to view Praia Grande its own particular
province objected to the program's being housed in the Secretary of Plann-
ing rather than their own Secretary of Culture, and suspected that
economic objectives would dominate preservationist ones. Further criticism
centered in the university, where self-proclaimed marxists, after 15
years of harsh supression, were beginning to feel sufficiently secure
to condem any initiative of the government and especially one which
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involved low-income groups such as the tenement dwellers of Praia
Grande. The business communitywhose aspiration was to see the area
razed and rebuilt, was skeptical of the government's ability to do much
good, or harm,but curious to see what the outside technocrats might pro-
pose and property owners, absentee landlords for the most part, perceived
a possibility of unloading their unprofitable holdings on the state. The
local population of poor tenants, artisans, prostitutes and small business-
men had heard the story too often in the past to pay much attention.
On the whole, though there was little overt conflict, cynicism and
suspicion ran high.
The tasK force, left to its own devices and aware that the initial
enthusiasm, publicity and flowery speeches lacked much substance, attempt-
ed to design a strategy. Its principal members were out-of-town pro-
fessionals, committed to the program for its social challenge and pro-
foundly disdainful of the institutional environment of which they were now
a part. They were intent to avoid becoming one more ineffectual bureaucracy
or the tool of any faction; something of a "fifth column" mentality pre-
vailed.
The group began to operate on three distinct levels. First, its
survival depended on satisfying the requirements of the bureaucracy to
which it nominally belonged, which meant going through the motions of
preparing schedules, budgets, progress reports, etc. and not causing
embarassment to the Secretary. Second, it had to discover and cultivate
potential sources of funding. State and municipal agencies could hard-
ly meet their own operating budgets and the federal ministries were per-
ceived to be so thoroughly politicized and ineffectual as to be of dubious
use. The parastatal corporations, dominated by competent technocrats
and with considerable discretion in allocating resources, proved more
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receptive. The task force prepared a portfolio of projects addressed
to the parastatals with jurisdiction over transportation, tourism, ports
and housing. Third, it was necessary to build a reliable constituency,
both within and without the institutional framework, to sustain what
promised to be a long-term undertaking. Attempts were made to divert and
to co-opt the opposition which had surfaced, to draw out any which hadn't
and to articulated potential gains to various interest groups. In this
task, being outsiders provided some particular attributes to the task
force. On the one hand, they were considered dedicated and technically
competent and afforded exceptionally free access to all local factions;
on the other, they were assumed to be politically naive and their motiva-
tion difficult to discern - it just didn't figure that they were as
disinterested as they claimed. It is more reassuring to know where the
man stands, even if (or especially if) he's a scoundrel.
Credibility began to build with implementation of the first physical
projects - a public square, street paving and sanitation, improvements to
the passenger port, all financed by the transportation parastatal. These
projects were very visible, obviously of public interest and sufficiently
respectful of the architectural patrimony to allay fears of special in-
terest and cultural insensitivity. They also served to stimulate a
degree of boosterism among some of the initial non-believers and of
confidence within the task force, which set it on an aggressive course of
expanding its sphere of influence.
It gave up any pretense of sub-ordination to an inoperative Policy
Commission and abandoned its coordinating role to initiate, design and
direct the implementation of specific projects - construction, training,
community mobilization, by whatever means presented themselves. The
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results were gratifying. Resources began to materialize from a variety
of sources, critics joined the effort,or focussed on other issuesand
some of the skeptics came aboard to claim a piece of the action.
The task force thought itself to be acting with great audacity and
was surprised to encounter virtually no resistence from those whose
spheres of competence it was invading. Granted, it was doing their work,
made efforts to keep them informed of the progress of "their" projects
and careful to see that they shared in the credits. Apparently the
outsiders were not perceived as a political threat. Still, they were
taken off guard when the Secretary of National Historic and Artistic
Patrimony, whose agency's financial contribution was nil and with whom
relations had been particularly strained, graciously accepted con-
gratulations on the program and publicly cited it as "the most important
program in terms of an architectural complex, underway in Brazil." 15
Hyperbole not withstanding, the backers of Praia Grande felt redeemed.
It is difficult to identify a single dominant power group in this
case. The cultural elite made the strongest claims of proprietership and
it definitely enjoyed a position of very high status within Sao Luis
society. But it proved ineffectual in moving from rhetoric to action,
except through its lower, younger and more highly politicized faction,
which eventually came to identify more with the program's social con-
cerns than with orthodox architectural restoration. The older, more
erudite elite appears to be on the wave, along with some other tradi-
tional powers, such as the "river bank colonel" political chieftains and
the urban merchant bourgeoisie,which are becoming anachronisms in con-
temporary Maranhio. Still, while they are relatively impotent to act,
they retain considerable ability to impede action.
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Undoubtedly the most decisive individual in the state was the
Governor. With the rural oligarchy in decline and no industrial elite
to speak of, economic and political matters were very dependent on the
national government party which he represented. He, however, faced
challenges from within the party and adopted a very tight, personalized
administrative style which required getting his ear on even minor
issues. The program came to rely heavily on his wife as its most effec-
tive conduit. Beyond his final authorization,neither the Governor nor
his bureaucracy were of much help in formenting decisions. This de-
pended largely on the ability of the task force to mobilize pressures,
from within and without the community and to articulate an issue to the
point where as simple "yes" or "no" was required. That they had no
political clout, but they had the mobility of their cause, the mystique of
their expertise and their apparent political disinterest to give them
credibility amoung a variety of potential allies, including the press,
the parastatals and the businessmen. Acceptance by these elites, who had
no overriding stake in the program, provided the status necessary for the
task force to act as a legitimate catalyst for coalition building
among. those groups with more direct interests in Praia Grande. These,
the cultural elite, the marxist sociologists, the low income residents
were capable of commitment to specific components, which were some-
times antagonistic, but not to the overall program.
The experience of this case confirms that urban development pro-
grams are, above all, complex political processes and ones in which
authority, legitimacy and commitment may be derived from various,
even conflicting, sources. It also demonstrates that the social
forces operative in present day Latin America are sufficiently
-58-
heterogeneous to provide opportunities for positive intervention
in longstanding problems.
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CHAPTER IV
MOBILIZATION: EXPLOITING OPPORTUNITY
It bears stressing that our intent is not devise formulas for in-
ducing dramatic societal change - to propose a new developmental
paradigm - nor to suggest that unrepresentative power structures are
doomed by the tide of history. (Even the word "commitment" may be over-
ambitious in describing the process we envision.) Rather than seeking
radical modifications of behavior, our intent, to resort once more to
Hirschman's wisdom, is "to show how a society can begin to move forward,
as it is, in spite of what it is and because of what it is,"' to dis-
cover where amoung the conditions and attitudes which seem impervious to
progress, there exist positive dimensions which can be stimulated and
put to productive use. Warwick, in building on the work of Hirschman
and Waterston, has developed his "transactional approach" along similar
lines. In dispelling what he calls the "myths of planning," he
emphasizes the political role of planners, their necessity to interact
with the society in which they function and the value of their ability
to mobilize "whether through a hiding hand or a gun to the head, un-
anticipated allies, resources and energies along the way."2
This approach has its risks. As in the case of the CONASUPO local
managers, there is the temptation to become too politicized, too
immediatist, to allow means to dictate ends. It may also give rise to
arrogance, the satisfaction which comes from manipulating unwilling
actors, from unsurping undefended spheres of influence and from colluding
with disdained interests, as happened to some degree in Praia Grande.
Above all, its a messy process, one inimical to the planning psyche.
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It requires the constant judgement of ambiguous situations and indivi-
duals, decisions based often more on intuition than on fact or theory,
the self assurance to establish limits to compromise, and the agility to
exploit breaches in the system.
If one accepts development as essentially a political process,
however, and one in which values are not universal, this approach assumes
its own rationality. Although the values vary, there does appear to be
a range of methods which have general applicability and it is in their
employment that we see grounds for optimism.
PRESENTATION
"Presentation" may strike us as uncomfortably close to "propaganda"
and "advertising" and thus beneath the dignity of serious consideration,
but it would be foolish to underestimate the long-term effects on a program
of how it is initially perceived by the community to which its directed.
First impressions, negative and erroneous ones, can become so firmly
entrenched as to resist subsequent rational evidence mounted to dispel
them. The CONASUPO program was launched with the fanfare required to
display strong federal government commitment and to build supportive
pressure from below; the limited opposition which was generated was less
significant, and in any case well founded and inevitable. In the Cauca
Valley, on the other hand the progressives unveiled their scheme with
unnecesssary arrogance. Their interests might have been better served by
diligent behind-the-scenes negotiation than by the blatant boosterism
which virtually challenged the large owners to defend their traditional,
honor-bound stance on property rights.
In Praia Grande, the programs promotors, confident in their backing
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by the state government, felt little compulsion to court the approval of
the cultural and academic elites, whose support they took for granted
and who subsequently caused them so much inconvenience. Initial efforts
were directed toward finding a sponsor and in their concentration on
committing the Secretary of Planning the program's promotors relied
heavily on outside pressures (perhaps due to being outsiders themselves)
at the expense of cultivating local elites. They published an elaborate
proposal, rich in photographs, maps and sketches and distributed it to
the national press. When a full page article in Rio's major newspaper,
lauding the proposal, appeared in Sio Luis, local interest galvanized
and the Governor convened a "Convention on Praia Grande", to which he
invited nationally recognized intellectuals,who provided a legitimacy
much superior to that of the state government and one the local elites
were obliged to respect. The respect was grudging, however, frought with
resentment and jealousy, and caused of a great deal of confusion and
delay in the initial phases of the program. The promoters would have
been shrewd to have been more generous in sharing the limelight with those
who considered themselves the traditional patrons of Praia Grande.
While the initial "selling" of a program may well require some
showmanship it is wise to be informed of the audience. Too often,
developmental endeavors are limited to a dialogue between believers and
believers - technocrats to technocrats or bankers to finance ministers.
Some of those ignored may unnecessarily become effective adversaries.
Planners are well advised to heed the ability of politicians to adjust
their presentation to the concerns of those being addressed, to dis-
tinguish between those who supply resources, grant authority, provide
the "elbow grease." This is not to suggest duplicity, but sensitivity to
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the wide range of valid aspirations which urban interventions engage.
BUILDING COALITIONS
In identifying "who counts" at the local level during a program's
implementation, Warwick cites two major categories. The "gatekeepers"
are those whose approval is required before any action can be taken. 3
They may be recognized formally or not and their approval may be explicit
or not. The group includes government organizations, numerous elites and
individuals who may not be readily recognized as power-brokers. Identify-
ing gatekeepers in a provinicial setting can be a daunting but crucial
task to an outside technocrat. The other category is that of the
"implementors", those who actually carry out the job. They have little
formal decisionary power and often no authority, but neither are they
mere delegates of the gatekeepers. They have their own interests and
motivations and ample opportunity, in institutionally precarious situations,
to distort the intentions of the givers of authority. Coalitions between
them and between individual implementors and gatekeepers, as well as
between gatekeepers, becomes the cement that bonds the program. The
implementors, through their more direct involvement and through their
ability to manipulate information, are frequently in a strong position
to determine which bonds shall be formed and which shall operate.
Peattie has shown how even low-status beneficiaries, squatters in Caracas,
manage to collude with low level officials to thwart the policy of higher
level authorities and Hirschman's "wily reformer", in Colombia, was
able to maneuver the highest authority behind his own purpose in an
alliance of very odd bedfellows. There, radical proponents of land re-
form aligned themselves with the Finance Minister's desire to improve the
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country's balance of payments through more efficient agricultural produc-
tion. In the process they acquired support for organizing peasant
leagues whose influence went far beyond the central government's inten-
tions.5
Praia Grande provides an instance where those most interested in its
success began with no coalitions or constituency of any kind. The
nominal sponsor, the Secretary of Planning, performed only the most
perfunctory gatekeeping duties while the rest of the community appeared
to be waiting to see what would happen. Coalition building began on
two fronts: with the parastatals from whom resources were sought and
with the cultural elite whose approval, which was being withhold, was
essential. The former were visited in their headquarters and supplied
with a continuous stream of specific proposals directed to their area
of competence. Personal relationships formed on common technical con-
cerns and mutual condemnation of political expediency and bureaucratic
incompetence. This was a "rational" technocrat to technocrat relation-
ship.
The cultural aristocracy was approached indirectly through the young-
er staff of the Secretary of Culture, a "New Bohemian" element, patrons of
the city's rich Afro-European-Amerindian popular culture and with access
to the old guard and to the university. Thier attitude towards the pro-
gram was amibguous, curious abobt what.it might mean for the musicians,
artisans and spiritual cultists of the area, but disinterested in
restoring old facades and frankly suspicious of the potential for gentri-
fication. Gaining their confidence, and eventual collaboration was
largely a process of establishing personal rapport over inumurable beers
in modest bars, displaying an interest in local folklore and providing
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assurances that neither IBM nor the CIA had any involvement in the
program. The coalition which eventually materialized was a horizontal one
of technical and cultural functionaries, but one which got the task
force in the door of two important pyramids - that of the real cultural
elite and that of the vociferous radical intellectual one.
While horizontal alliances may be sustainable over long periods,
vertical ones, especially ones which transcend hierarchies, appear much
more subject to temporal factors. Anthony Downs proposes a five stage
"attention cycle" to describe how societies confront issues over time:
a pre-problem stage in which the issue is ignored, or considered un-
solvable; then a euphoric phase in which a solution is discovered and
enthusiastically promoted; followed by the realization that it goes
against influential interests which are in a position to thwart it; then
public interest fades, leaving the issue to languish in the hands of a
few die-hards; and finally a post-problem stage where the effort is
largely ignored, but accepted, and quiet progress can be made.6 These
stages and their effect on the composition of coalitions are evident in
the three cases reviewed. The early enthusiasm of the Cauca Valley
boosters and their foreign champions ran into heavy oppostiion from the
landed gentry, subsided into a lower keyed phase of consolidating their
position with national government support and eventually proceeded under
a variety of temporary coalitions with the university, private associations
and federal agencies. Even CONASUPO, despite its ostentatious national
party sponsorship, became subject to shifting alliances at the national
level as implementation progressed and dependent on whatever support
mid-level administrators could muster within individual communities. In
Sao Luis the excitement of press coverage and national convention which
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launches the program also coalesced the latent opposition. It became
necessary to form new associations, to broaden the base beyond the
technical-administrative middle ground in which it was conceived.
Early efforts to reach down proved frustrating. Meetings with
public market vendors to plan the rehabilitation of their facility
produced only skepticism; the time was not ripe, elections were too far
off. A slide presentation of the program's objectives to 40 aging
prostitutes put most of them to sleep, they felt they were being lectured
by missionaries. A "June Festival" fair intended to mobilize the low-
income tenants was received as just that: beer, dancing and carnival rides,
with no lasting impact. These groups were all eventually engaged, but only
after they had witnessed concrete results and had been presented con-
vincing proposals addressed to their own specific perceived needs.7
Help from above came through unexpected channels. The head of state
Corporation of Tourism was probably the most effective official involved
in the program (she was later dubbed "the Godmother of Praia Grande").
Dona Zelinda is a very forceful woman, well connected socially and
determined to impose her will on the macho environment of Maranhense
public administration. She obviously enjoyed advising the out-of-
town technocrats and aggressively championed their cause. Through her
mediation the Governor's wife was brought into the act, and between the
two of them, the Governor was manoeuvered into commitments beyond what
could have been expected otherwise, and browbeaten by the women into
living up to them.
The sources of fruitful coalitions may not always be apparent, nor
their reliability once established. It seems prudent to assume however
that those determined by the organization charts of developmental programs -
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those chains of technocrats and politicians that lead from donor agencies
through ministeries to ever lower administrative bureaucracies - pro-
vide at most a skelton to be fleshed out with the local powers which
make things happen. It is also apparent that some alliances provide the
broad legitimacy required to sustain an endeavor through its various
stages, while quite different, often temporary, ones are essential to
implementing particular tasks. In either case expert knowledge and
moral conviction are no doubt useful prerequisites for those who seek to
consolidate commitment, but much depends on the rapport brought about
through mutual respect, a sensitivity to unshared aspiration, the willing-
ness to listen. In this regard, perhaps the most effective role of the
reformer is to serve as a catalyst for the creative forces already pre-
sent in the community, a focus for assembling and articulating
latent capabilities.
OVERCOMING OPPOSITION
Important as the building of support through coalitions is, over-
coming resistence, whether it is founded or not, may be a more taxing
and often critical activity. Those businessmen who opposed CONASUPO had
rational grounds for doing so, at least in the short run. Their market
was effected and any benefits they may have realized from improved food
production and distribution were doubtful. The landowners in the Cauca
Valley seemed less reasonable. They could sell off non-productive land
for more than the cost of taxation if industrialization were to
intensify; they could have seen themselves as potential beneficidries
of urbanization. Yet their resistance to the development corporation was
relentless, because deep-rooted class perogatives were at stake. In
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Praia Grande, opposition was more subtle. No one could openly attack
the preservation of the national heritage (except perhaps for descendents
of slaves, but what reservations they expressed were to make a point
of principle, not to impede progress) and in fact this aspect of the
program provided a sort of halo which kept more pragmatic objectors, such
as property owners and Rotary Club boosters for modernization, at bay.
Opposition was based more on questions of prestige, acknowledged authority
and traditional spheres of competence. The cultural elites were not
pleased to see the Secretary of Planning, an entity entrusted with
promoting industrial investment and agricultural productivity, bring in
outsiders to interfere in their baliwick. They expressed their reserva-
tions in highly critical articles in several of the six dailies of the
town (one of each major political faction). The attack was centered in
the Departments for History and Sociology of the Federal University.
Here, the Planning Secretary's political astuteness proved invaluable.
Although the state had its own welfare and research entities, he publicly
invited the two university departments to join the project, with re-
sponsibility for social policy and historical research. Refusal would
have been awkward for the university, which has been expressing interest
in trying its hand at the real world, and so the two departments
became members of the program's Commission in a neat instance of
neutralizing the opposition through incorporation.
Opportunities to distract trouble-makers may also be exploited. On
several occasions federal preservation authorities expressed concern,
and the threat of veto, of projects which failed to incorporate sufficient
reverence for orthodox restoration. These threats, which usually would
have required substantial increases in budget to pacify, could sometimes
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be diverted by calling attention to much more serious depredations of
the patrimony occuring elsewhere. A providencial distraction from which
the project benefited in several regards was the arrival of ALCOA in
Sao Luis. The first of the large industries attracted by the discovery
of major mineral deposits in the western Amazon region and Sio Luis'
potential as the only deepwater port in northern Brazil, provided a new
focus for those distrustful of the federal and local regirres. The multi-
national was widely perceived, as an imposition of foreign and southern
(Brazil) economic interests, one which would produce extensive environ-
mental damage and stimulate further rural immigration without benefit-
8ing the local community. Xenophobia was running high. By comparison,
threats to Praia Grande seemed quite innocuous.
Embarassment, or its threat is another effective, if sometimes risky,
means of neutralizing opposition. Many prominent citizens have engaged
in activity they would rather not have publicized and there are usually
enemies willing to expose them. The major risk is one's own vunerability
to counter exposure and in this regard, the outsider, lacking much local
history, may have an advantage. Accusations of undue financial gain may
not be very damaging in themselves, but when coupled with a cause to
which the accused professes great commitment they can become awkward.
In several instances, properties targeted for acquisition by the program
changed hands before they could be purchased and were then offered at
exhorbitant prices. (Disappropriation was a legal alternative to
negotiation, but an administratively torturous one). When inside infor-
mation was suspected and familial ties established, between the recent
purchaser and someone involved in the program, the threat to make the
linkage public could sometimes reduce the asking price to a reasonable
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level. There is evidence of the threat of exposure being employed by
Cauca Valley promoters to ensure the solidarity of those collegues
with ties to land interests behind property taxation, and in Mexico to
keep politicians in line with government policy.
Money is not the only subject of this tactic. Prestige and vanity
can also be operative. The regional director of the federal authority
entrusted with historic preservation in Sao Luis was a political
appointee with extreme pretentions to erudition and open contempt
for the program and its promoters. He held a veto power over physical
interventions in much of the area, and the manner in which his approval
was sought was usually more decisive than the subject of approval. The
"Carmo Church Steps" is an illustrative example.
The square on which the church fronted was being redesigned to
improve traffic and pedestrian circulation and to enlarge leisure areas.
The Director had no objections to the design per se, but threatened with-
holding his approval unless the church access, an elaborate flight of
steps, was restored to its "original design", as depicted in a prized
early 20th century photograph he owned. The task force tried to disuade
him by pointing out that the older design had no functional advantages
(that it had no aesthetic ones, either, they kept to themselves) and would
be very costly to replicate. A respected local historian, aware of
the debate and sympathetic to the task force brought the group's atten-
tion to a 19th century painting which showed an even earlier design,
quite similar to the present one. Confronting the Director openly
with this evidence of older "originality" would have been undiplomatic,
probably forcing him to save face by either questioning the authenti-
city of the painting or devising some other objection. The solution
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was to have him become aware of the painting in an indirect manner, and
one in which he couldn't be certain whether his adversaries would ever
know of its existence not. He evidently decided it wisest to drop the
issue, for it never came up again.
Such manipulative tactics, of course, have little to do with con-
solidating commitment and may indeed solidify resistence when they back-
fire. However, officious behavior is still quite prevelent in pre-
industrial bureaucracies and one which is often impervious to persuasion
or overt coersion. Grindle has described the ingratiating, if not down-
right obsequious, approach of some CONASUPO managers toward local politi-
cians. Insincere respect may be accepted, or even expected, but it is
usually recognized for what it is and more easily exploited by the re-
ceiver than the giver. Cooperation granted on the basis of flattery
will usually incur a debt repayable in more substantial form. Bullying,
on the other hand, while perhaps capable of producing short term results,
is likely to cause resentment, repayable in a variety of insidious ways.
While personal relationships may be exceptionally important in Latin
America, the vain politician and the officious bureaucrat are probably
best approached with the detached formality which obviates intimate
association.
Recognized expertise can be especially useful in countering opposi-
tion in societies where class distinction and authoritarianism prevails,
the more distant its source the more deserving of respect. Developmental
literature abounds with accounts of imported know-how which didn't work
but does little to discredit the mystique. One can hardly speak of
economic planning in Latin America without referring to Milton Friedman
or the Cauca Valley Development without acKnowledging its debt to David
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Lilienthal. The initial interest in the Praia Grande proposal was no
doubt due in part to the fact it was proposed by a foreign professional.
But with time, while he and his colleagues gained the trust of the
community, they lost some of it's adminiration. It became fruitful to
invite respected national and foreign experts to come and to give
assurance and, consiously or not, to mediate disputes. Experts from
UNESCO told the cultural elite that the preservation of a large
architectural complex did not require the absolutely rigorous restoration
of every building feature. Sociologists from Sao Paulo convinced the
radical that the low-income residents stood a better chance within the
program than if left to fend for themselves. Economic planners
were persuaded by their more sophisticated colleagues from the capital
that the tourism and real estate potential was real. national trans-
portation planners supported plan to restrict vehicular traffic. Out-
of-town experts need not be inhibited by local prejudice or politics, so
they must be carefully selected.
There may come a time when the only way to silence opposition is
to raise one's voice and bang one's shoe on the table. Justification of
this method is probably better founded in psychology than in theories
of rational organizational behavior and it should certainly not be
applied indiscriminately by mid-level technocrats. But there are occas-
ions, in emotionally expressive societies, when prolonged patience may
be interpreted as lack of conviction, or a willingness to compromise as
cowardice, or when the boundaries of one's authority require affirmation.
Such occasions arose in Praia Grande, when the Secretary of Planning's
efforts to accommodate dissenters were taken for wavering leadership,
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for example. When he became aware of behind-the-scenes maneuvering to
transfer the program to another agency, he reacted with a violence that
precluded any doubt about his determination to maintain complete and
sole control. The task force coordinator too, was challenged, when his.
propensity to delegate more responsibility than was the custom, was
interpreted as disinterest in administrative authority. By the time
he became aware of a colleague's preparations to oust him, bureaucratic
procedures for the transfer of the position were already in place. A
violent and unequivocal reaction on his part reversed the operation
immediately, whereas a more tempered attitude would have likely entailed
an unsatisfactory compromise. In another instance, the public market
vendors, who the task force was treating rather paternalistically in their
effort to revitalize the market, were becoming unmanageable. They
proved quite adept at manipulating the well-intentioned technocrats
through a combination of flattery and insistence on their past mistreat-
rent by officialdom. After reluctantly agreeing to demands which were
becoming progressively difficult to justify as public expenditures and
unable to convince the vendors of their unreasonableness, the task force
stormed out of a joint meeting, implying that the whole marKet project
would be cancelled. The following day, the leaders of the vendor's
union appeared to apologize and withdraw their most recent demands.
The violent approach is probably only justified for achieving
specific, short term objectives. it also requires that its victims have
at least an intuitive awareness that their own position is either
unreasonable or untenable, and that their retreat does not preclude
more long term goals.
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BY-PASSING CONFRONTATION
Preferable, and usually less taxing than attempting to overcome opposi-
tion once it has been articulated, is avoiding it in the first place.
There is a natural tendency, and often the need, to seek broad coali-
tions, but this propensity should not preclude the ability to be selective,
to maintain a cautious distance from powerful groups who may prove un-
responsive to persuasion and imune to coersion. Unnecessary confronta-
tion with them can be disasterous and positive engagement may afford
them the opportunity to distort a program to their own limited inter-
ests. It may be wiser to let sdeeping dogs lie. Who, and when, to mobilize
often requires careful orchestration as a program moves through suceed-
ing stages, effecting different groups and requiring differing forms of
support.
Maintaining a low profile toward those one would rather not arouse
while attempting to consolidate support for' popular, visible social pro-
grams is a tricky business. Much depends on convincing the potential
opposition that their interests are not effected, that the undertaking is
of such a nature, or so insignificant a scale as to pose no threat. The
Cauca Valley promoters felt little need to act with restraint and were
forced to take the landed gentry head on and at considerable cost. It
is doubtful whether they could have avoided this confrontation indefinite-
ly, but is it probable that resistence could have been attenuated by "break-
ing the news" of land taxation more gradually. CONASUPO, despite its
incontestable authority, avoided more serious conflict wit'n business
interests by opening its first stores in areas where it would not be
aggressively competitive with private stores. When it came to addressing
peasant concerns it acted with discretion, establishing a separate
entity and attempting to stimulate grass roots demand, rather than con-
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front traditional rural elites directly. The Praia Grande group felt
compelled to keep even potential allies, such as the business community,
at arm's length out of fear of their ability to unsurp the program.
Assistance from the well-endowed State Secretary of Public Works was
also declined until the group felt confident in its ability to control the
interventions of the agency, which had long alienated the cultural elite
through its gross insensitivity to the architectural heritage of the
area. This elite, in both its local and national components, had made
it clear that it would not be circumvented. It required careful nurtur-
ing, through the initial implementation of modest urbanization projects
which didn't threaten its area of concern to progressively more
ambitious ones.
To the extent that one cannot escape the attention of unwanted powers,
it may be feasible to convince them that one represents their interests.
Thus, for instance, foreign fundamentalist missionaries are tolerated
among Brazil's Amazon Indians. Though they are the subject of widespread
suspicions, and open contempt on the part of National Indian Agency
anthropoligists, their willingness to teach Portuguese to the natives and
to instruct them on the evils of communism guarantees their welcome by
the agency's conservative military leadership. The Cauca Valley pro-
gressives assured themselves an unusual degree of autonomy by assuming
the national government's role in promoting economic development on a large
scale. While it didn't generate consistent federal support, it achieved
the industrialists' interest of keeping the bumbling bureaucracy from
interfering. It does not seem overly cynical to propose that even as
worthwhile an undertaKing as CONASUPO was motivated, to some extent, by
the governments' need to confirm its representation of urban labor and to
neutralize a potential focus for unrest. On a more modest scale, the
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Praia Grande task force did eventually manage to convince radicals,
intellectuals and businessmen that it had their interests at heart; by
keeping the interests separated, as well as the groups themselves,
major conflict was minimized. In this case, the interests themselves were
not so much circumvented, as their interaction. The antagonism which had
characterized meetings of the Coordinating Commission, in which all
groups had participated, diminished with the quite dissolution of the
Commission and subsequent filtering of communications through the task
force. This shouldn't, of course, be taken as a condemination of efforts
to promote dialogue between different interests, but that, lacking strong,
commonly - perceived objectives such interaction may be counterproductive.
When it becomes impossible to either disengage or convincingly re-
present an inopportune faction it may still be possible to reduce their
negative impact by inducing a third party to confront them, to do one's
"dirty work". The Praia Grande group frequently felt itself trapped in a
no-mans-land between intellectuals, politicians and business where open
conflict with any of them could be very harmful. One such instance re-
volved about a proposed new fishing port. This facility promised a
substantial World Bank loan, which the state government was very inter-
ested in securing. The port was to be sited some distance from the city
and designed to accommodate a (largely future) modern commercial fishing
fleet, but its justification required that the traditional coastal fleet
also be relocated there. The latter, composed of several hundred small
sailing vessels currently docked, sold its catch and was serviced in Praia
Grande, a much more convenient anchorage. The task force was made to feel
downright disloyal to the State when it objected to the eviction of the
fishing fleet and that it was jeopardizing an important investment.
Alerting the national cultural agency of the proposal relieved them of
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the ackward position. It's director raised sufficient ruckus in the
capital to kill the plan with no implications on the task force. This was
not a typical client patron relationship, in which services are exchanged
through a pyramidal hierarchy. The two agencies, federal authority and
local task force, were in fact quite antagonistic. Nevertheless they had
a common interest in which the more powerful entity could be induced to
take up the battle of the weaker, sparing it an inconvenient engagement.
Even when mutual concerns are not that apparent, more influential groups,
or individuals, can often be enticed into entering a fray, if only to
demonstrate their own authority or to weaken an adversary.
Why powerful groups chose to align themselves with specific endeavors
is often difficult to access. It is noteworthy, for instance, that
neither the Church nor the military feature prominently in the cases review-
ed. One might have expected the Church to actively support the CONASUPO
program, or conservative generals to come to the aid of the beleaguered
land owners of the Cauca Valley. Part of the explanation is probably
the ability of these groups to control, or at least strongly influence,
the conditions which allow development programs to flourish, rather than
to enter the action directly. Yet, to view them as all-powerful, behind-
the-scenes puppet masters is too simplistic. It seems more likely that
their agendas contain sufficient scope of accommodate a broad range
of activity, but that, as a body, they are moved to intervene only when
major threats to the social order materialize. If they become involved
in lesser matters it is generally as individuals, or small factions.
While their power certainly shouldn't be underestimated they appear to
allow for considerable latitude for substantial, partial or no engagement
and largely at the discretion of more direct decision-makers.
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SUSTAINING COMMITMENT
Mobilizing the enthusiasm to undertake a program and maintaining it
mobilized long enough to get the job done are two very different tasks.
As Downs' "attention cycle" analysis points out, many come forth to offer
their praise for the launching of a new enterprise only to disappear when
the drudgery of putting it together, piece by piece, begins. "Revolutions
are not made by dramatic speeches before cheering crowds, but through long
nights of grinding the mimeograph", it has been said. Politicians are,
of course, particularly adept at rationing their effort to its immediately
realizable benefits and of inspiring others to take on the work but
technocrats and academics are no slouches at avoiding hard work, either
and to the businessman its the essence of effective management.
Thus the structuring of the Cauca Valley Development Corporation
was largely due to the efforts of one man. He had an enthusiastic
cheering section, sometimes too enthusiastic, but when it came to the
tedious process of badgering the government into enabling legislation
and initial funding they were content to cheer from the sidelines.
Later in the program, when initiative lagged, it became the task of
small groups of young progressives to inject new momentum. Even the
Mexican program with strong backing from the national regime became
periodically dependent on a few dedicated individuals to prod it for-
ward.
Praia Grande went through its stage of euphoria, with ample press
coverage, convention of intellectuals and attention from the Governor,
then sank into quasi-oblivion. part of the reason is the way in which
state administrations are structured in Maranhao. As planning has come
into vogue, each governor-elect undertakes to devise his four-year
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plan - in our case, the "Joao Castelo Government." In the months between
election and inauguration he assembles panels of politicians and pro-
fessionals anxious for a position in his administration, to produce
sectoral plans: transportation, housing, sanitation, agriculture, etc.
Capital projects are then divided into three groups. "Impact projects"
are those calculated to have the greatest potential for popular appeal,
those counted on to produce votes in the next election, to project the
Governor to a seat in the senate. They have his constant personal support
and will receive funding priority, no matter what. Castelo's prime
impact project was a new stadium and sports complex (popularly dubbed
the "Castelio", Big Castle, in a play on his name).. It took a large
chunk of the State's budget, was of questionable utility and its
construction scandal-ridden, but it was inaugurated during his senatorial
campaign and he won the election. The next category, in order of priority,
are "Basic Infrastructure Projects": major roads, sanitation networks,
irrigation and the like. These are usually subject to substantial
federal financing and entrusted to state sectoral agencies, headed by
politicized technocrats. At the bottom of the list are "Obligations" to
localized or special interest groups - a municipal hospital, water supply
to a new subdivision, or a wharf for the fishing fleet - and Praia Grande,
an obligation to the cultural elite. These projects are postponed as
long as possible or partially satisfied when demands became sufficiently
intense. The task force argued that theirs was an "Impact" project,
that the whole city harbored deep affection for Praia Grande, that the
entire nation was concerned for its fate. The Governor agreed, slapped
them on the back, and told them go to it - with whatever funds they could
get from the federal government. They sought help from their direct
boss, the Secretary of Planning. He made vague promises; after all, he
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had a large portfolio of "basic infrastructure" to attend to.
It was apparent that stage two, "euphoria", had run its course.
The initial boosters, the politicians, had achieved their major objective
of displaying to the intellectual elite their concern for the cultural
patrimony, cheaply. If the issue died there, it might be just as well,
since the client was voicing objections to the proposed approach and
further action might only excite his ire. He could probably be satisfied,
for the time being, with a forum for expressing his own views.
The task force, anxious to maintain what momentum had been generated,
sought support elsewhere. It attempted to reach the Secretary of
Culture through its budding rapport with some of his staff. His
response was sympathetic, almost too much so. Unbeknownst to them, or
any one else, he negotiated with the Governor to take over the program.
When the Secretary of Planning was belatedly consulted, he reacted
violently (the deal was complicated by the involvement of a European
commercial development group representing by the Governors chief of
staff), his autonomy impinged. The task force managed to use the
incident to secure more staff, work space and a minimal operating budget.
The small gambit was employed two more times, by now with the sly collu-
sion of the task force, when getting the Secretary's attention proved
difficult. As neglected wives have long known, the coveting of ones
possessions by others can provide a most persuasive incentive to affirm
one's own commitment.
The timing of activity is an obvious, but frequently underappreciated,
factor in any program. The constraints imposed by the "sexenio"
administrative cycles in Mexico have been mentioned, as well as the
futility of appraoching special interests in Praia Grande before cir-
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cumstances were ripe. Political campaigns undoubtedly provide one of the
most fruitful opportunities for solidfying support, if one in which it
is essential to distinguish between the usefulness of immediate gain and
promises of dubious reliability. Praia Grande reached "impact project"
status in such a situation. A year before national elections, the Governor,
who would be running for the Senate, and the Secretary of Planning for
Congress on the government party ticket, were becoming sensitive to the
substantial opposition which was beginning to coaleese in the capital.
Radicals, who has resisted the program, had become assured that it was
not the scheme of outside commercial interests nor of any particular
local businesses and directed their criticism towards other activities
associated with the government party and against Alcoa. The tasK force,
following tactics devised by the First Lady, convinced the Governor
that a strong display of commitment to the program would enhance his
image to the socially and culturally concerned intelligencia, provide
opportunities for demogoguery, and attract some national press, without
offending anyone; and at lost cost; but that time was running out. His
condition was that six projects - renovation of the market, a cultural
center, a hotel, a park, a hostel for indigents and a primary school -
all be concentrated in one small area and be simultaneously ready for
inauguration in 11 months. The task force recklessly assured him of the
feasibility of his plan and began a period of intense activity.
(Though far from complete at the end of his campaign, there was sufficient
visible progress to provide a suitable setting for speech-making and
popular festivity.) While this commitment evaporated on election day,
it had provided sufficient impact to sustain the program through the
inevitable reshuffling of priorities of the new administration.
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This instance also relied, to a degree on the potential of inter-
regional pressure. The Governor, in entering national politics, was
conscious of the necessity to overcome his image as a provincial bump-
kin. Though Praia Grande was far from being a national issue, it was
photogenic and capable of arousing a response in the progressive
south where the architectural heritage has largely been obliterated.
It could attract media coverage and promote the Governor as a man of
culture. In a country as large as Brazil, and where communications
technology has far outpaced regional economic equity, television
especially has become a potent integrating force and one which politicians
at all levels use to effect. Images of deteriorating colonial mansions
impressed viewers in Sao Paulo more than ones of the soccer stadium or
road paving, even if their facades were partially obliterated with campaign
posters; and some of the coverage materialized into national media interest.
Hirschman has emphaeized the role played by remote elites in prodding
provinical development, how, when they represent more advanced regions
and when their own immediate interests are not at stake, they often
assume positions of authority and paternalism toward their more back-
ward cousins. Thus southern elites have generally been the promoters
of irrigation schemes and rational land use in Brazil's drought-prone
Northeast, while the local landed oligarchy has been reluctant to
support any endeavor which might upset the status quo. In Columbia, too
what land reform has taken place in the provinces has been largely due
to the pressures of urban groups intent on achieving greater agricultural
efficiency and a national balance of trade. More ideological reformers
were able to employ this distant interest in furthering their local
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purposes. The immediate value of external support may not always be
apparent, but its relative immunity to the ebb and flow of local interests
gives it the ability to sustain a program over difficult or dormant
periods, and advances in communication technology provide new opportunit-
ies for stimulating it.
At the opposite end of the support structure is the often small core
of true believers whose commitment may be taken for granted, but even
their motivations may be quite varied - faith in the enterprise may be
dependent on its potential for acquiring influence, promoting one's career
or more noble ends, but which nevertheless require periodic payment.
Successes are undoubtedly stimulating and opposition can be useful
forging internal bonds, but stagnation can generate the frustration
which gives rise to dissension, the questioning of approach, of leadership
or of objectives. The complex and lengthy nature of urban development
programs provides ample opportunity for frustration, and those committed
for idealistic, rather than for financial reasons are likely to be th.e more
easily discouraged or induced into rash actions. On such occasions
it is probably wise to devise internal tasks, preparatory to future
endeavors and geared to the interests of particular participants, or to
make oneself useful to other related activities which at least assure
a justification for ones continued mobilization. Praia Grande was
subject to several prolonged lapses in activity and dependenton
the continuous motivation of a small, heterogeneous core of impatient
activists. During interruptions in the-program, the marxists went off
to interview slum dwellers, the historian to advise an out-of-town
research team, the engineer to assist the municipality on a traffic
problem. While these activities weren't directly related to the current
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work, they contributed to maintaining morale as well as to cementing
outside relations and building a portfolio of projects which could be
called forth as opportunities for their development appeared. One
advantage of the institutional fragility of provincial administrative
bureaucracies is the flexibility afforded to circumvent rigidly
proscribed responsibilities in adapting to the necessities of the cir-
cumstance.
This catalogue of methods for building commitment is far from
complete, the range of motivations from financial gain to power, status,
loyalty, honor, trust and altruism too vast to allow for a comprehen-
sive treatment here. The intent has been to display, through reason
and example, that even those societies which have been characterized
as rigidly controlled and unresponsive to any but the most obviously
self-serving stimuli offer a variety of opportunities for positive
manipulation, if not drastic reform, by the perceptive advocate.
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CONCLUSION
If one accepts that the course of events is not entirely dependent
on the whim of impish gods, or on the nefarious machinations of a few
dour old men, it requires no great leap in faith to conclude that inter-
national donor agencies and remote national governments, too, have only
limited control over populations they seek to influence. While their
cwn behavior often appears to ignore this state of affairs, development
planning experience tends to confirm it. This thesis has been
structured on the positivist convictions that people do have a sub-
stantial say in their own destinies, that they respond to a wide array of
stimuli and that while these include advocates of development, they are
most effectively motivated within the context of their own environment
and on their own terms. it has attempted to develop a pragmatic approach
for employing some of the more recent trends in developmental policy,
namely flexibility, participation and decentralized decision-making,
in inducing local forces to promote change in traditional Latin
American societies.
A basic precondition, it would seem evident, is that programs be
founded on widely-shared and unassailable aspirations. They need not
have universal support, but should possess a moral authority which shields
them from substantial, overt criticism. The more efficient distribution
of subsistence food in Mexico, for instance, though it affected powerful
business interests, could not be openly attacKed. Industrial growth in
the Cauca Valley was, at the time, accepted as the most valid of develop-
mental objectives. In Sio Luis there may have been reservations about the
economic wisdom of the undertaking and abcut the irtentions of its pro-
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moters, but the professed goal of protecting the revered cultural
patrimony provided a "halo" over the program which brought differing
interest groups together and kept effective opposition at bay. The ability
of a program to capture, and to link, a broad spectrum of interests to
a common concern appears to be a basic qualification for viability.
Beneath this protective umbrella one can identify several operative
forms of commitment. There is the official authority, granted usually
by some level of government. It may, or may not, assure credibility
depending on how the entity is perceived by the community. Then there is
the legitimacy which can only be bestowed by widely acknowledged
arbiters of value, those above suspicion. They may be loved or feared
but most important is that their blessing commands respect. There are
also the more limited, direct interests whose commitment is required,
if only temporarily, to carry out specific tasks. These may be subject
to differing even conflicting, incentives or openly antagonistic, in
which case means must be devised to neutralize their ill-effect.
Finally there is a core of dedicated advocates whose determination,
perhaps more than any substantive power, propels the endeavor through
opposition and apathy. Their persistence may count for more than numbers,
something close to obsession which allows them to subvert every circum-
stance to their noble cause. It would seem to be the positive interaction
of these different forms of commitment which drives a complex program
forward.
In pre-industrial societies, with ineffectual institutions, critical
support is likely to be situated more without than within the established
bureaucracies. Persuasion and coersion may become more operative than
"rational" argument and these societies may also present more
-86-
heterogeneous and less organized concentrations of power, providing
opportunities to cultivate a range of interests which transcend elitist
structures. Furthermore, where personal reputation counts more than
institutional representation, the adherence of a few individuals may
be sufficient to achieve limited objectives.
It is not our intention to imply that progress in Latin America
depends entirely on the application of ad hoc solutions to modest
objectives by scheming advocates. We do find, however, that the
ambitious policies and highly trained professionals which determine the
thrust of developmental planning are of limited relevence outside the
contextual reality of the communities to which they are directed and
that despite glaring inequities and high concentrations of power there
is effective capability at the local level, and ample opportunity to
motivate it behind efforts to induce positive change.
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